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“EQUALITY AND PRIVACY BY DESIGN”:
A NEW MODEL OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE DATA TRANSPARENCY VIA
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Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Sean K. Hallisey *
ABSTRACT

Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI) are often
described as technological breakthroughs that will completely
transform our society and economy. AI systems have been
implemented everywhere, from medicine, transportation, finance, art,
to legal and social spheres, and even in weapons development. In
many sectors, AI systems have already started making decisions
previously made by humans. Promising as AI systems may be, they
also pose urgent challenges to our everyday life. While much
attention has concerned AI’s legal implications, the literature suffers
from a lack of solutions that account for both legal and engineering
practices and constraints. This leaves technology firms without
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guidelines and increases the risk of societal harm. It also means that
policymakers and judges operate without a regulatory regime to turn
to when addressing these novel and unpredictable outcomes. This
Article tries to fill the void by focusing on data rather than on the
software and programmers. It suggests a new model that stems from
a recognition of the significant role that the data plays in the
development and functioning of AI systems.
Data is the most important aspect of teaching AI systems to
operate. AI algorithms begin with a massive preexisting dataset,
which data providers use to train the system. But the data that AI
systems “swallow” can be illegal, discriminatory, altered, unreliable,
or simply incomplete. Thus, the more data fed to the AI systems, the
higher the likelihood that they could produce biased, discriminatory
decisions and violate privacy rights. The Article discusses how
discrimination can arise, even inadvertently, from the operation of
“trusted” and “objective” AI systems.
To address this problem, this Article proposes a new AI Data
Transparency Model that focuses on disclosure of data rather than, as
some scholars argue, focusing on the initial software program and
programmers. The Model includes an auditing regime and a
certification program, run either by a governmental body or, in the
absence of such entity, by private institutions. This Model will
encourage the industry to take proactive steps to ensure and publicize
that datasets are trustworthy. The suggested Model includes a safe
harbor, which incentivizes firms to implement transparency
recommendations even without massive regulatory oversight. From
an engineering point of view, the Model recognizes data providers
and big data as the most important components in the process of
creating, training and operating AI systems. Even more importantly,
the Model is technologically feasible because data can be easily
absorbed and kept by a technological tool. Further, this Model is also
practically feasible because it follows already existing legal
frameworks of data transparency, such as the ones being
implemented by the FDA and the SEC.
Improving transparency in data systems would result in less
harmful AI systems, better protect societal rights and norms, and
produce improved outcomes in this emerging field, especially for
minority communities that often lack resources or representation to
challenge AI systems. Increased transparency of the data used while
developing, training or operating AI systems would mitigate and
reduce these harms. Additionally, to better identify the risks of faulty
data, industry players must conduct critical evaluations and audits of
the data used to train AI systems; one way to incentivize this is a

430

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

certification system to publicize good-faith efforts to reduce the
possibility of discriminatory outcomes and privacy violations in AI
systems. This Article strives to incentivize the creation of new
standards, which the industry could implement from the genesis of AI
systems to mitigate the possibility of harm, rather than post-hoc
assignments of liability.
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INTRODUCTION
Commentators and experts frequently herald artificial intelligence
(“AI”) as a technological breakthrough that will completely
From medicine to
transform our society and economy. 1
transportation, finance to art, legal systems to social structures, and
many other sectors, AI systems hire, fire, grant loans, predict diseases,
and decide who will go to jail and how long they will stay there. 2
Many decisions previously determined by humans are now made by
autonomous AI systems. 3 These AI systems, embedded in computers

1. See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE NEXT DIGITAL
FRONTIER?
4
(2017),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Advanced%20Electronics/
Our%20Insights/How%20artificial%20intelligence%20can%20deliver%20real%20valu
e%20to%20companies/MGI-Artificial-Intelligence-Discussion-paper.ashx
[https://perma.cc/JF98-XLCJ] (“Artificial intelligence is poised to unleash the next
wave of digital disruption, and companies should prepare for it now. We already see
real-life benefits for a few early-adopting firms, making it more urgent than ever for
others to accelerate their digital transformations. . . . AI investment is growing fast,
dominated by digital giants such as Google and Baidu. Globally, we estimate tech
giants spent $20 billion to $30 billion on AI in 2016, with 90 percent of this spent on
R&D and deployment. . . . [E]arly AI adopters that combine strong digital capability
with proactive strategies have higher profit margins and expect the performance gap
with other firms to widen in the future . . . . [E]arly adopters are already creating
competitive advantages, and the gap with the laggards looks set to grow. A successful
program requires firms to address many elements of a digital and analytics
transformation, including set up the right data ecosystem.”).
2. See, e.g., Hilke Schellmann & Jason Bellini, Artificial Intelligence: The
WALL
ST.
J.
(Sept.
20,
2018),
Robots
Are
Hiring,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/artificial-intelligence-the-robots-are-now-hiring-movingupstream-1537435820 [https://perma.cc/X26T-556Z]; Ingrid Lunden, Kabbage Gets
$200M from Credit Suisse to Expand Its AI-Based Business Loans, TECH CRUNCH
(Nov. 11, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/11/16/kabbage-gets-200m-from-creditsuisse-to-expand-its-ai-based-business-loans/[https://perma.cc/HV64-EWN6]; Adam
Liptak, Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES (May
1,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-asoftware-programs-secret-algorithms.html [https://perma.cc/MD23-6P4R]; Steve
Lohr, IBM Creates Watson Health to Analyze Medical Data, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13,
2015),
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/04/13/ibm-creates-watson-health-toanalyze-medical-data/ [https://perma.cc/J7JV-DPCH] (describing the practical
applications of AI to various industries).
3. See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633,
633 (2017) (“The accountability mechanisms and legal standards that govern such
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and robots, have begun to automate workplaces and have created
new applications that rely on the vast amounts of data produced by
Corporations, governments, and
society’s daily occurrences. 4
individuals are investing in the AI sector, creating the specter of a
new Industrial Revolution. But if society comes to over-rely on AI
too rapidly, it risks overlooking potential problems that may arise. 5 It
is true that machine learning offers broad opportunities for

decision processes have not kept pace with technology. The tools currently available
to policymakers, legislators, and courts were developed to oversee human
decisionmakers and often fail when applied to computers instead. For example, how
do you judge the intent of a piece of software? Because automated decision systems
can return potentially incorrect, unjustified, or unfair results, additional approaches
are needed to make such systems accountable and governable.”); Joy Buolamwini &
Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial
Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1, 1 (2018) (“Even AIbased technologies that are not specifically trained to perform high-stakes tasks (such
as determining how long someone spends in prison) can be used in a pipeline that
performs such tasks.”); HANNAH FRY, HELLO WORLD: BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF
ALGORITHM 25–48, 49–78, 141–74 (2018) (discussing the biases and risks of AI
systems in different fields, such as justice, data analytics and crime, in contrast to the
trust and faith the public give to advanced technology); see also MCKINSEY GLOBAL
INST., supra note 1, at 31–69 (describing the use of AI systems and its implications in
different fields, including retail, electric utility, manufacturing, healthcare and
education); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank A. Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due
Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2014) (discussing the
vast use of AI systems versus its risks); Hilke Schellmann & Jason Bellini, Artificial
Intelligence: The Robots Are Now Hiring — Moving Upstream, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
20, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/video/series/moving-upstream/artificial-intelligencethe-robots-are-now-hiring-moving-upstream/2790C6B9-4E47-4544-933136DB418366CF?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=3 [https://perma.cc/V4XV-RX9A]
(noting that “nearly all Fortune 500 companies” are using tools that deploy AI to
weed out job applicants, including a video that discusses biases and fairness);
DELOITTE, THE STATE OF THE DEAL: M&A TRENDS 2019 (2018)
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/mergersacqisitions/us-mergers-acquisitions-trends-2019-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D2L2C2YK] (detailing 1,000 executives’ expectations and involvement with M&A activity
and emerging technologies); Leon Saunders Calvert, Using AI to Predict
Opportunity in M&A, REFINITIV: DEAL INSIGHTS (June 20, 2018),
https://blogs.thomsonreuters.com/financial-risk/ai-digitalization/using-ai-to-predictopportunity-in-m-and-a/ [https://perma.cc/TXU4-4SA8].
4. See Jason Bellini, The Robot Revolution: The New Age of Manufacturing,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2008), https://www.wsj.com/video/series/moving-upstream/therobot-revolution-the-new-age-of-manufacturing-moving-upstream/0C3B7686-7D974BCE-980B-FAED24F27672
[https://perma.cc/TY36-6RGT]
(reporting
that
hundreds of millions of jobs are affected by AI, and trillions of dollars of wealth are
created by replacing employees).
5. See Kai-Fu Lee, The Human Promise of the AI Revolution, WALL ST. J.
(Sept.
14,
2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-human-promise-of-the-airevolution-1536935115 [https://perma.cc/UEC2-E4QV] (“The AI revolution will be
of the magnitude of the Industrial Revolution — but probably larger and definitely
faster.”).
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innovation in a host of areas such as climate and physical,
transactional, and behavioral data about people, pandemics,
pharmaceuticals, infrastructure, and supply chains. 6 However, as AI
technologies grow in prominence and become more easily
implementable, stakeholders must acknowledge that AI has the
dangerous potential to violate laws and societal norms. 7
The growing AI industry is dominated by huge firms that collect,
hold, or can afford to access massive amounts of data. 8 But data can
be flawed — indeed, instances abound of massive companies utilizing
AI systems that produce biased outcomes. In one instance, Amazon’s
AI facial recognition software, Rekognition, wrongly identified
twenty-eight members of Congress as individuals who had jail
mugshots. 9 These results demonstrate the existence of race and
gender biases present in facial recognition AI system. 10 Similarly,
Facebook’s software is known to identify the “ethnic affinities” of
users’ characteristics, which advertisers can then use to exclude

6. See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is for, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1921–22
(2013).
7. See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 1, at 4, 8 (stating that “AI promises
benefits, but also poses urgent challenges that cut across firms, developers,
government, and workers,” and that “machine learning has limitations. For example,
because the systems are trained on specific data sets, they can be susceptible to bias;
to avoid this, users must be sure to train them with comprehensive data set.”); Liam
Hanel, A List of Artificial Intelligence Tools You Can Use Today — For Businesses,
MEDIUM (July 11, 2017), https://medium.com/@LiamHanel/a-list-of-artificialintelligence-tools-you-can-use-today-for-businesses-2-3-eea3ac374835
[https://perma.cc/KB54-S3YE]; see also Daniel Newman, AI and ML Prediction to
FORBES
(July
23,
2018,
10:56
AM),
2019,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielnewman/2018/07/23/three-ai-and-machinelearning-predictions-for-2019/#238d7c784948 [https://perma.cc/7HHX-K96F].
8. See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 1, at 14; see also Rana el Kaliouby,
This App Knows How You Feel from the Look on Your Face, TED (May 2015),
https://www.ted.com/talks/rana_el_kaliouby_this_app_knows_how_you_feel_from_th
e_look_on_your_face/transcript?language=en
[https://perma.cc/MDM5-8DAU]
(describing how data was collected from 2.9 million face videos for a project that
began at MIT).
9. Jacob Snow, Amazon’s Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of
ACLU
(July
26,
2018,
8:00
AM),
Congress
with
Mugshots,
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/amazonsface-recognition-falsely-matched-28 [https://perma.cc/XZ4K-EZXG] (“Nearly 40
percent of Rekognition’s false matches in our test were of people of color, even
though they make up only 20 percent of Congress.”).
10. Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 3, at 1 (demonstrating empirically that AI
systems can discriminate based on classes like race and gender, and evaluating the
biases present in automated facial analysis algorithms and datasets by percentage
with respect to phenotypic subgroups).
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certain users from viewing particular promotions. 11 These troubling,
biased consequences are not inevitable in an era of Autonomous,
Automated, and Advanced AI Systems — the so-called “3A Era.”
Rather, they highlight that AI technologies pose crucial challenges
that policymakers must address. 12 These challenges cut across firms,
developers, governments, and employees; therefore, proper legal and
regulatory schemes must be established to ensure that AI
development is neither held back nor goes too far. 13
The innovations in AI technology are moving too fast for Congress
to effectively understand and grapple with. Inadequate regulatory
schemes might be unbalanced: too permissive a scheme would give
cover to and perpetuate existing discrimination in AI programs, while
a scheme too restrictive would halt the development of AI technology
altogether, stymying its potential benefits. Thus, it is vital to create a
framework that can help the industry, the public and policymakers
identify where problems with data occur, how they occur, and why
they occur.
Once these nuances are better understood, the
government can more effectively regulate the AI industry. To that
end, this Article proposes an AI Data Transparency Model that
focuses on illuminating how AI systems utilize data. This Model
differs from other commentaries on the risks of AI systems in that it
does not oppose the use or expansion of AI systems. Rather, this
Model recognizes that regulatory schemes have to focus on the source
of threats and hazards in AI systems — the data itself.
The Transparency Model recommends an auditing and certification
regime that will encourage transparency, and help developers and
individuals learn about the potential threats of AI, discrimination,
and the continued weakening of societal expectations of privacy. If
firms choose to utilize non-infringing data from beginning to end,

11. Julia Angwin & Terry Parris Jr., Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by
PROPUBLICA
(Oct.
28,
2016,
1:00
PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-lets-advertisers-exclude-users-by-race
[https://perma.cc/5GGJ-4SNK] (“The ubiquitous social network not only allows
advertisers to target users by their interests or background, it also gives advertisers
the ability to exclude specific groups it calls ‘Ethnic Affinities.’ Ads that exclude
people based on race, gender and other sensitive factors are prohibited by federal law
in housing and employment.”).
12. See generally Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Xiaoqiong (Jackie) Liu, When

Race,

Artificial Intelligence Systems Produce Inventions: The 3A Era and an Alternative
Model for Patent Law, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215 (2018) (discussing why intellectual

property laws have become irrelevant, outdated and inapplicable in the 3A Era,
when AI systems produce patentable inventions or copyrightable works of art, and
suggesting an alternative model for patent law).
13. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 1, at 4.
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from the very first steps of developing and training AI systems
through the actual operation of those systems, the likelihood of
discriminatory outcomes and privacy violations will be greatly
reduced.
The proposed Transparency Model takes into account the nature
of how AI systems work and the prevalence of multiple stakeholders,
each of whom is responsible for developing and operating AI systems
(the “Multi-Player Model”). 14 These stakeholders may include
software programmers, data providers, users, sellers and distributors
of AI systems, manufacturers, and others such as the public and the
shareholders of firms. 15 As part of the regulatory scheme of the
Model, we first contend that each of these stakeholders, especially the
data providers, should concern themselves with potential adverse
outcomes that AI systems might create. Stakeholders must consider
the possibility that AI systems will misinterpret data and produce
discriminatory outcomes or otherwise violate human rights. The
Model includes a certification process, whereby stakeholders can
align, assert, and publicize their efforts to produce AI systems that
conform with a transparency industry standard. This certification can
be determined internally, or conducted by a third-party auditing
agency; either way, the purpose is to encourage the development of a
certifiable, uniform industry standard. This Article argues that
cultivation of a strong certification process is soundly justified by law
and economics and would spur public demand for ethical use of AI.
Finally, the Model will raise awareness about the dangers that may
arise when stakeholders overlook the possibility that certain
compositions of data can have discriminatory effects.
Just as technology has exploded in the 3A Era, so has the literature
concerning the legal implications of AI’s proliferation. 16 However,
the literature to date has tended to focus on the operation of AI

14. Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 12, at 2231–36 (coining the “Multi-Player
Model” and describing the affiliation between each of the entities in AI systems and
the challenge to ownership and accountability that a model of many stakeholders
imposes on the AI industry). The development of AI systems is a multi-faceted
process, involving numerous “stakeholders.” Such stakeholders include data
collectors, data aggregators, programmers, trainers, operators, all the way up to
executives who market and sell AI services. We use the term “stakeholders” to
encapsulate each of these roles, because we argue that each of these distinct actors
should concern themselves with the ramifications of AI systems and grapple with
their effects.
15. See id.
16. See Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and a Roadmap, 51
U.C. DAVIS L. REV 399, 401, 403 (2017).
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systems, rather than on the data used to train them. 17 This leaves
technology firms without guidelines, which increases the risk of
societal harm and leaves policymakers and judges without a
regulatory regime to turn to when addressing the novel and
unpredictable outcomes of AI systems. This Article also tries to fill
that void with the Transparency Model, which focuses on data, rather
than on software programmers or algorithms. It is important to
mention that some scholars, notably Professor Joel Reidenberg, have
opposed the prevailing position that transparency of software and
algorithms alone will not completely resolve existing issues of bias
and prejudice in AI. 18 This work goes a step further to suggest great
emphasis and focus must be placed on the data itself. Focusing on the
data is vital and can usher in newfound understanding of how and to
what extent AI systems should be integrated into nearly any aspect of
society.
A short review of some other important works that have been
conducted regarding AI systems demonstrates that a thorough
discussion of data itself is missing from the literature at large. In a
landmark article, Solon Barocas and Andrew D. Selbst, two scholars
who have pioneered the study of the effects of big data and the
advent of the internet on individuals’ privacy and civil rights, noted
that algorithms and the use of big data compromise the spirit of
decades old anti-discrimination statutes. 19 They warned of the need
to pass new statutes that counteract the dangers that algorithms and
big data pose to society. 20 There has been a steady creep of AI into
consumer finance, and it remains an unresolved question who should
bear the burden of ensuring that their AI applications do not
discriminate, target, or fail to provide services to protected
demographics. 21 Current laws are insufficient to address these risks,
but overregulation could hinder the development of the technology.22
Many others have raised concerns about the new challenges that AI

17. See id. at 402 (collecting examples of scholars raising issues pertaining to the
effects of AI systems and the “vast increase in computational power and access to
training data . . . ”).
18. See Kroll et al., supra note 3, at 658 (“However, transparency [of source code]
alone is not sufficient to provide accountability in all cases.”).
19. See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate
Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016).
20. Id. at 671 (“[A]n algorithm is only as good as the data it works with.”).
21. See, e.g., Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big
Data, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 148 (2016) (arguing that lenders should bear that
burden).
22. See id. at 189–90.
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systems pose for criminal justice. For example, scholars have
discussed the inadequacy of current legal doctrines in protecting
citizens from automated suspicion algorithms, which identify suspects
and suspicious activity that would ordinarily be identified by a human
police officer. 23
There are numerous problematic features of machine learning
First, there is
algorithms that make regulation difficult. 24
discreetness, the fact that machine learning applications can be
developed with limited visible infrastructure. 25 Next, because so
many different entities develop machine learning applications,
diffuseness makes it difficult to identify who should be regulated.26
Further, the opacity of the developing process creates the possibility
that the machine learning application will produce outcomes that are
not traceable to particular inputs, and it might be difficult, if not
impossible, to retroactively determine the rationale of the decision. 27
Policymakers cannot hope to resolve all the issues identified above
by increasing transparency alone, but resolution certainly requires
transparency.
Consider discreetness, for example: with better
transparency, it would be possible to account for the infrastructure
that is present. Creating a log or record to detail who worked on a
particular application and what their work entailed is certainly
Additionally, making the data sources of an AI
possible. 28
application transparent would help control outcomes by ensuring that
the application is using the “right” data, rather than impermissible
ones. Increasing transparency, thus, will contribute to a larger
consensus: something needs to be done to address the new challenges
created by AI and machine learning systems.
This Article discusses how workflows and bottlenecks in AI
development illuminate policy responses that could reveal the data
sources used to train AI systems. It further identifies data issues that

23. See MILES BRUNDAGE ET AL., THE MALICIOUS USE OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE: FORECASTING, PREVENTION, AND MITIGATION 28, 96 (2018); see also
GABRIEL HALLEVY, WHEN ROBOTS KILL: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE UNDER
CRIMINAL LAW 16, 21 (2013) (“Some researchers argue that the current law is
inadequate for dealing with AI technology and that it is necessary to develop a new
legal domain called Robot Law.”).
24. See Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks,
Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 369 (2016).
25. Id. at 369–70.
26. Id. at 370.
27. Id. at 371, 373.
28. See Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to
Algorithms and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2017).
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policymakers should focus on and proposes a Model of Data
Transparency that could solve some of these issues. Finally, this
Article puts forth three modest recommendations. First, stakeholders
in the development of AI systems should take steps to audit the data
used to train AI systems in order to ensure that the data does not
violate regulatory requirements surrounding discrimination and
privacy, or the rights of copyright holders. Second, a certification
process will help consumers and policymakers understand what is at
stake and will clearly indicate to the public what operators ought to
ensure that data is used properly. Finally, a safe harbor approach that
would limit liability for AI operators in certain circumstances, such as
where an AI operator takes significant effort to avoid data misuse but
a transgression occurs nonetheless.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly describes how
AI systems operate and how they develop, focusing on the important
role that data plays in these processes. Next, Part II examines issues
surrounding datasets that can discriminate or violate privacy norms.
Part III then presents the AI Data Transparency Model and discusses
how it will help ameliorate the issues examined in Part II. The main
objective of this Article is to highlight that AI systems are not free of
faults and vices, and to stress the vital role of data transparency in
addressing these problems. Through this framework, policymakers
can better understand the interests at stake with respect to AI systems
and the role they play in society, the economy, and the world.
I.

DATA MATTERS: TRAINING THE AI

AI systems are different from traditional algorithms in that they
incorporate human-like thought processes that enable them to make
decisions autonomously. 29 Throughout the development of AI
systems, many different stakeholders offer critical contributions. One
of the most important phases of creating AI systems is “teaching”
them to operate, which starts with a preexisting dataset that data
providers use to train the systems. 30 These providers can be
programmers, trainers, the ones who enable access to data, or the

29. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV.
659, 661–63 (2017); see also Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 21, at 159 (defining an
algorithm as “any well-defined computational procedure that takes some value, or set
of values, as input and produces some value, or set of values, as an output”) (quoting
THOMAS H. CORMEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 1 (3d ed. 2009)).
30. See, e.g., Training ML Models, AMAZON MACHINE LEARNING,
https://docs.aws.amazon.com/machine-learning/latest/dg/training-ml-models.html
[https://perma.cc/YN3A-F9TX].
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systems’ users — whatever entity assembles the data is, in a sense, the
data provider. By studying the data, the AI system learns to
recognize patterns and similarities; as the system absorbs more
datapoints, its capabilities grow in an evolving and never-ending
process. 31 Whereas an algorithm or formula creates outputs that
derive from fixed weights attached to input variables, an AI system
adjusts its weights according to the patterns it identifies from ideal
outcomes chosen by the data provider. 32 Even with this control over
the data provided, AI systems often remain black boxes: They may be
able to correctly and consistently predict a particular outcome, such
as the likelihood of credit default, but they cannot explain the reasons
for this conclusion. 33
AI systems have become ubiquitous and easy to develop. The
proliferation of AI systems has resulted in numerous ready-to-use
options available for free download on the internet. 34 Once the AI
structure is installed, the data trainer exposes it to vast amounts of
data, teaching it what outcomes are desirable and to reject unwanted
ones. Through this process, the AI learns to recognize patterns that
could lead it to identify positive matches on its own. 35 The current
explosion of AI applications would not have been possible without
the advent of “Big Data” and the ability of entities to collect massive
amounts of information. Huge repositories of data exist on the
internet, 36 but trainers can also create their own datasets or rely on
third parties to collect new data. 37 However, a critical limitation of

31. Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure
in Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181, 189–90 (2017); see also YaniskyRavid, supra note 29, at 672–81(describing the process of developing AI systems and

their ten human-like features, such as creativity, autonomy and unpredictability).
32. See Lee Bell, Machine Learning Versus AI: What’s the Difference?, WIRED
(Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/machine-learning-ai-explained
[https://perma.cc/8Y3K-5KTG].
33. Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 11,
2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/
[https://perma.cc/S52Q-CWHA].
34. See, e.g., TENSORFLOW, https://www.tensorflow.org/ [https://perma.cc/MPN7SNLM].
35. Hence, the advent of the “Big Data” era. Merriam-Webster defines “big
data” as “an accumulation of data that is too large and complex for processing by
traditional database management tools.” Big Data, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (Online ed.
2019),
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/big%20data
[https://perma.cc/4FTG-R6PK].
36. See,
e.g.,
Datasets,
KAGGLE,
https://www.kaggle.com/datasets
[https://perma.cc/46EX-ZXMN].
37. The
bAbI
Project,
FACEBOOK
RESEARCH,
https://research.fb.com/downloads/babi [https://perma.cc/2PS7-ZWBY].
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reusing existing data is the difficulty of determining its origins,
because data collected and tailored for one use may not be
appropriate for another use. 38
The utility of a dataset depends in large part on four attributes: its
volume, velocity, variety, and veracity. 39 Volume indicates its size;
velocity indicates its “freshness,” that is, whether or not the
datapoints have become outdated; variety refers to the sources of
data (for example, some datasets combine information from various
sources, often making them more valuable); and veracity refers to the
data’s accuracy. 40 As the AI is exposed to data, its system identifies
patterns and can be taught to perform a huge variety of tasks,
including differentiating dogs from cats, 41 bad omens from good
omens, 42 or criminals who are likely to reoffend from those who are
not. 43 An AI system can learn to recognize faces or emotions by
sifting through huge sets of portraits from people all around the world
conveying different emotions — it can distinguish between anger and
sadness, or between one face and another for any number of
purposes. 44 As long as there is sufficient data to train an AI system,
the potential applications are endless. This process is called machine
learning. 45

38. Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99 MINN. L. REV. 535, 544–46 (2014).
39. Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 ARIZ.
L. REV. 339, 345–46 (2017).
40. Id.
41. Dogs
vs.
Cats,
KAGGLE,
https://www.kaggle.com/c/dogs-vs-cats
[https://perma.cc/VAP5-SWQ6].
42. Press Release, Metro Pictures, Trevor Paglen: A Study of Invisible Images,
http://www.metropictures.com/exhibitions/trevor-paglen4/press-release
[https://perma.cc/5AZC-JH94] (“To make the prints in Adversarially Evolved
Hallucinations, Paglen trained an AI to recognize images associated with taxonomies
such as omens and portents, monsters, and dreams. A second AI worked in tandem
with the first to generate the eerie, beautiful images that speak to the exuberant
promises and dark undercurrents characterizing our increasingly automated world.”).
43. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminalsentencing [https://perma.cc/QBM7-S29B].
44. Emotion AI Overview, AFFECTIVA, https://www.affectiva.com/emotion-aioverview/ [https://perma.cc/F285-8PPX].
45. For a more thorough definition of machine learning, see David Lehr & Paul
Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine
Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 671 (2017) (“[M]achine learning refers to an
automated process of discovering correlations (sometimes alternatively referred to as
relationships or patterns) between variables in a dataset, often to make predictions or
estimates of some outcome.”).
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Not only can AI systems “predict” outcomes that directly affect
humans, but they can also create new content. 46 For example, an AI
system can write novels, news articles, and, hypothetically, a court
opinion or law review article. 47 An AI system can create works of art
Programmers
or music and produce patentable inventions. 48
pursuing writing applications for AI would train the system using
datasets that teach it the structure of language, such as the
interrelationships between subjects, verbs, and objects, and how
particular words have congregated together previously. 49 A data
trainer might accomplish this by exposing an AI system to a dataset
containing written materials pertaining to a specific field, or a more
generalized set of works. 50 A programmer designing an AI system
that composes jazz music would expose it to a vast catalog of existing
jazz recordings, which the system would break down into tiny
electronic signals to learn the statistical correlations between different
notes. 51 With this knowledge, the system can create new melodies
that match the trajectories of preexisting ones, without “copying”
earlier works. 52
Following this initial teaching phase, the trainer must give the AI
system feedback. 53 Here, the trainer will introduce new pieces of
information and ask the AI system to identify its parameters. 54 The

46. Matthew Hutson, How Google Is Making Music with Artificial Intelligence,
SCI. MAG. (Aug. 8, 2017, 3:40 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/08/howgoogle-making-music-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/NA5B-TQHB].
47. Joe Keohane, What News-Writing Bots Means for the Future of Journalism,
WIRED (Feb. 16, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/robots-wrote-thisstory/ [https://perma.cc/TJ7Q-LZYG].
48. See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 12, at 2224–26; Yanisky-Ravid, supra
note 29, at 663.
49. Danny Lewis, An AI-Written Novella Almost Won a Literary Prize,
SMITHSONIAN (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/ai[https://perma.cc/G9UWwritten-novella-almost-won-literary-prize-180958577/
YYV7].
50. Ngram
Viewer,
GOOGLE
BOOKS,
http://storage.googleapis.com/books/ngrams/books/datasetsv2.html
[https://perma.cc/3VLQ-KSVX].
51. To listen to jazz produced by AI systems and understand how it works, see

Episode 51: AI and Intellectual Property Law, Featuring Prof. Shlomit YaniskyRavid, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J., PODCAST (May 3, 2018)
(downloaded using iTunes) [hereinafter AI and IP Law Fordham Podcast]; see also
SONG
DATASET,
https://labrosa.ee.columbia.edu/millionsong/
MILLION
[https://perma.cc/R2DN-W7XG] (2011).
52. AI and IP Law Fordham Podcast, supra note 51.
53. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 45, at 684–88.
54. Id. at 685.
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trainer will indicate when the system is correct and when it is wrong. 55
This feedback phase allows the AI system to hone in on its ultimate
objectives, increasing the system’s accuracy and efficiency. 56 Even
once the system is publicly released, trainers can continue to refine
the AI system by continuing to correct its errors, resulting in a
feedback loop that continuously improves the AI systems’ utility. 57
Products of machine learning that depend on massive amounts of
collected data promise to transform society. Such systems will not
only have the capacity to predict results and meet objectives, but also
be able to reform and reshape us. 58 For example, consider an AI
system that presents a mix of news stories to a user, but as that user
clicks on particular kinds of stories, the system alters the types of
news stories it chooses to present to the user. 59 Over time, the system
will learn that user’s preferences and will thus reflect the news stories
that the algorithm chooses to show the user. 60 Undoubtedly, the
potential effects of this feedback loop are significant, as different
members of society could develop dramatically different conceptions
of the communal status quo. This capacity to shape opinion and
perspective is precisely the reason that the workings of AI systems
must be closely examined, lest there be some glitch or unseemly detail
that could be used to trick and manipulate. 61 This latter concern is
particularly important considering the Transparency Model discussed
here. AI systems can also perpetuate disparities in employment:
They can judge applicants and determine who should be offered a job

55. Id.
56. Id. at 696–97 (describing the “tuning process”).
57. Id. at 699–700.
58. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1925.
59. Julia Angwin, On Google, a Political Mystery that’s All Numbers, WALL ST. J.
(Nov.
4,
2012,
5:09
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203347104578099122530080836
[https://perma.cc/2FAT-67VD] (noting an increased likelihood that a Google News
user who searched for “Obama” will receive more news regarding Iran, compared to
a user who searched for “Romney”).
60. This mechanism is not unlike movie or clip recommendations created by
algorithms for Netflix or Youtube users. See Libby Plummer, This Is How Netflix’s
Top-Secret Recommendation System Works, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/how-do-netflixs-algorithms-work-machine-learninghelps-to-predict-what-viewers-will-like [https://perma.cc/EC9K-GSR2].
61. Jihii Jolly, How Algorithms Decide the News You See, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV.
(May
20,
2014),
https://archives.cjr.org/news_literacy/algorithms_filter_bubble.php
[https://perma.cc/PR78-24TM].
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or which employees deserve promotions. 62 An AI system designed to
predict who will be a successful employee, or who should receive a
promotion, will be able to do so only after the programmer trains it
using historical hiring and promoting data. But this kind of
application risks perpetuating and extending historical disparities in
employment, rather than ameliorating them.
In summary, AI systems can learn to perform any number of tasks
typically carried out by humans. Once AI systems are exposed to
massive amounts of data, they can analyze preexisting datasets,
associate variables and attributes with positive and negative
outcomes, and use these associations to predict, create, and decide.
Through feedback, AI systems can learn from their own mistakes,
improve performance, and identify more conclusive drivers of
positive outcomes. But the success and reliability of AI systems
depends on the kind and quality of the underlying data they are
trained on. AI systems can reach undesirable social outcomes if their
harmful results are deemed “positive matches” by the system because
of faulty datasets, because they were not properly trained, or because
of a lack oversight.
II. THE LEGAL CHALLENGES AND HURDLES OF USING BIG DATA:
THE THREAT OF DISCRIMINATORY OUTCOMES AND PRIVACY
VIOLATIONS
One of the main goals of this Article is to identify areas where
using unevaluated datasets to train AI systems could lead to
undesirable public policy outcomes. Because of the opaque nature of
how AI systems function, it is often difficult (if not impossible) to
determine the harms that result from using discriminatory, illegal, and
unethical datasets after the fact. That being the case, this Part of the
Article forms the basis for our recommendation that data providers
for AI systems within the industry must take active steps to scrutinize
and audit the quality of the datasets they use to train their AI
systems. This kind of scrutiny early in the process is tremendously
important, especially when the AI industry is mainly controlled by
massive firms which are dominant in the market and have ongoing

62. For an economic study of a machine learning tool meant to predict the
productivity of teachers and police officers, see Aaron Chalfin et al., Productivity and
Selection of Human Capital with Machine Learning, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 124, 124–
26 (2016).
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access to massive quantities of data. 63 Moreover, where datasets are
subject to buy and sell agreements, or where firms retain exclusive
rights over datasets, there is a significant risk that the interests of the
public will not align with the goals of the entity using the data. 64
This Part describes two areas where a faultily-composed dataset
used to train AI systems could spur adverse outcomes. Section II.A
explores the ways in which partial, incomplete, wrong, or biased data
can lead to discriminatory or illegal outcomes. It demonstrates that
when AI is used in economic sectors where discrimination triggers
liability, there is a clear need to ensure that the data is “clean.”
Section II.B considers how privacy requirements can pose significant
obstacles to the development of AI systems and demonstrates the
importance of instituting a Privacy by Design framework to ensure
that privacy concerns are respected at all stages of the AI system’s
development, especially at the training phase. 65
A. Discriminatory Data

1.

AI and Discriminatory Data

There are many ways in which AI systems can create
discriminatory outcomes by relying on “bad” data; this is becoming
more and more a pressing problem, because unsurprisingly AI
systems play constantly growing roles in areas of the economy where
AI systems, for example,
Congress prohibits discrimination. 66
conduct background checks for employment. 67 They evaluate tenants

63. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 1, at 6 (noting that companies at the
“digital frontier” — online firms and digital natives such as Google and Baidu —
invested an estimated $20 billion to $30 billion in AI development in 2016).
64. See, e.g., infra notes 179–181 and accompanying text.
65. It is of note that the discussion herein, regarding adverse outcomes that result
from problematic datasets, is not meant to be exhaustive — there are many other
problems that arise from faulty data, such as potential copyright violations of
material contained within a dataset.
66. For a discussion on the logic of anti-discrimination legislation, see generally
Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination
Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2000).
67. Brian Blum, Intelligo Gives Background Checks The AI Treatment,
ISRAEL21C (July 17, 2018), https://www.israel21c.org/intelligo-gives-backgroundchecks-the-ai-treatment/ [https://perma.cc/46N3-NVYM] (“Indeed, AI shines the
brightest when it can make connections and identify patterns in the way that only a
machine can . . . . Another AI advantage: it can check and recheck a target’s
background automatically, ensuring that any red flags on individuals or companies
are discovered in real time.”).
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who apply for leases. 68 They determine a person’s creditworthiness,
and even predict future terrorist and criminal conduct. 69 In each of
these examples, the objective of the AI system is to distinguish
between “safe” people and those to avoid. 70 Hence, AI systems have
become powerful filtering tools, sorting and categorizing persons in
many areas, and their influence and dominance will surely continue to
grow in significant and unpredictable ways. How AI systems
accomplish these sorting tasks depends in large part on the data used
by the data providers to train them. The data providers must identify
for the AI system examples of good employees, tenants, or debtors.71
Implicitly, the AI system will have to decide what personal traits
make certain candidates undesirable. 72 In order to avoid running
afoul of anti-discrimination laws, data providers must ensure that the
variables contained within the datasets pertain specifically to the job
at hand and do not contain biased, illegal, or irrelevant characteristics
such as gender, race, or sexual orientation. 73
On a more abstract level, AI developers may need to evaluate who
gets to define the characteristics of a good employee or tenant. For
example, Barocas and Selbst demonstrate the interests and stakes
that policymakers must consider in the context of employment
discrimination. 74 To reduce the probability that AI systems might
illegally discriminate against potential employees, Barocas and Selbst
have identified potential stakeholders who might be able to tackle
this crucial problem, such as the employer or an auditor like the
EEOC or a private third party. 75 They also identify numerous
obstacles: the question of whether the employer has collected data, or
68. See, e.g., NABORLY, https://naborly.com/ [https://perma.cc/9BAV-HAXT].
69. See,
e.g.,
ZEST
FINANCE,
https://www.zestfinance.com/
[https://perma.cc/KR7D-5NDQ]; see also supra notes 2 and 3.
70. See generally Desai & Kroll, supra note 28.
71. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 45, at 672–73.
72. Id. at 665 (“If programmers specify output variables in ways that make
members of certain demographic groups more likely than others to have
‘advantageous’ outcomes, discrimination can be introduced.”).
73. It is worth mentioning that anti-discrimination statutes do seem to imply that
AI operators should choose unbiased datasets that do not result in unequal,
prejudicial outcomes. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 694–714. However,
legal obstacles, such as trade secret protections, make it very difficult to actually
achieve
the
goals
of
non-discriminatory data. See generally Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade
Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343
(2018) (discussing how trade secrets prevent scrutinizing sentencing algorithms and
other uses of AI in the criminal justice system).
74. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 694–714.
75. Id. at 718–19.
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if it resorted to data collected by third parties; whether the model
used is internally developed, or if it was purchased from a third
party. 76 They note that third parties that specialize in human
resources may prove more than able to audit the employment
decisions made by AI models. 77

2.

Disparate Impact

Numerous federal statutes prohibit discrimination. 78 There are two
main types of unlawful discrimination: intentional discrimination and
disparate impact. 79 Disparate impact claims arise where a policy,
although facially neutral, creates a statistical imbalance that adversely
impacts a protected group: 80
Disparate impact is not concerned with the intent or motive for a
policy; where it applies the doctrine first asks whether there is a
disparate impact on members of a protected class, then whether
there is some business justification for that impact, and finally,
whether there were less discriminatory means of achieving the same
result. 81

Under a theory of disparate impact, a plaintiff need not
demonstrate any animus on the part of the defendant. 82 Instead, all
the standard requires is that a protected group is disproportionately
affected by a practice or policy relative to other groups. 83 There are
generally four elements to a disparate impact claim: (1) statistical
imbalances that indicate an adverse impact on a protected group,
caused by (2) a facially neutral policy, (3) which was “artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary,” supported by (4) factual allegations that

76. Id.
77. See id.
78. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Gender Pay Gap: Blaming the Victims — Are
Women Responsible?!, in NYU ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 91, 96–103 (67th
ed. 2015) (reviewing antidiscrimination legislations regarding gender and the gender
pay gap) (on file with author).
79. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015) (noting the distinction between disparate treatment
and disparate impact).
80. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 694.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 701.
83. See id.; see also Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2518
(“[A]ntidiscrimination laws must be construed to encompass disparate-impact claims
when their text refers to the consequences of actions and not just to the mindset of
actors, and where that interpretation is consistent with statutory purpose.”).
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indicate a “robust causation” between the policy and the disparity.84
When these elements are met, it is possible to demonstrate
discrimination through statistical analysis by showing that a facially
neutral policy resulted in a disparate impact. 85
The U.S. government regulates discrimination by economic sector
and heightens prohibitions in specific contexts such as employment,
housing, and consumer finance. 86 The Fair Housing Act of 1968
(FHA), for example, prohibits discrimination in the buying or selling
of homes on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin.” 87 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA) prohibits discrimination against people over the age of
forty in employment decisions. 88 There are many other antidiscrimination statutes in various areas of American jurisprudence
that read very similarly to the FHA or ADEA. 89 The overarching
ideology behind these statutes is that the characteristics of a person
belonging to a protected group ought to be irrelevant to the selection,
evaluation, or compensation of that person; by making those factors
irrelevant, the law can eliminate “stubborn but irrational prejudice.” 90
It is worth noting that the statutes mentioned above prohibit both
intentional discrimination and practices that produce disparate
impacts. 91
While there has not been extensive litigation regarding AI systems
and discrimination, existing cases make clear that decision-makers are

84. See, e.g., Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2522–24; see also Robert G.
Schwemm, Fair Housing Litigation After Inclusive Communities: What’s New and
115
COLUM.
L.
REV.
SIDEBAR
106
(2015),
What’s
Not,
https://columbialawreview.org/content/fair-housing-litigation-after-inclusivecommunities-whats-new-and-whats-not/ [https://perma.cc/9GD6-H7VX].
85. See generally Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 78.
86. See infra notes 87–90.
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988).
88. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631 (2016); see also Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544
U.S. 228, 232 (2005) (noting that Congress enacted the ADEA in response to a report
from the Department of Labor, which stated that arbitrary discrimination on the
basis of age was occurring).
89. See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the
Essentially Contested Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2318 (2006);
Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination & Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 643
(2001) (“The canonical idea of ‘antidiscrimination’ in the United States condemns the
differential treatment of otherwise similarly situated individuals on the basis of race,
sex, national origin, or other protected characteristic.”) (internal quotations omitted).
90. Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1563 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Post, supra
note 66, at 10.
91. See Rutherglen, supra note 89, at 2330–31 (2006). See generally Schwemm,
supra note 84.
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prohibited by law from using a variable that is irrelevant to job
performance and produces disparate impacts.
When the
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority’s police department
instituted minimum running speed requirements, ostensibly to
increase the quality of the police force, a district court struck those
requirements down on the basis of their disparate impact on women
applicants. 92 A fire department was prohibited from considering
personal contacts and familial relationships when evaluating
candidates because of the negative disparate effect this would have on
black candidates. 93 These kinds of prohibitions are reminiscent of AI
systems that evaluate social media accounts for tenants or run
employment background checks. 94 Existing precedent logically
extends to prohibit utilizing variables that have a disparate impact on
protected groups in creating, developing and relying upon machine
learning systems as decision-makers.
These cases demonstrate that biased results can occur despite any
explicit reference to a protected group, and this should concern AI
system operators who work in regulated sectors. ZestFinance, a
lending company that has an AI system to determine whether
someone should receive a loan, serves as a good example of how the
cases described above can apply to AI when the system relies on new
datapoints. 95 Its system is trained to flag when potential clients
quickly scroll through the terms and conditions and interprets
someone who divulges their social media connections as a riskier
applicant than someone who does not. 96 These attributes may or may
not be good indicators of creditworthiness — scrolling through terms
and conditions, and the speed at which you do so, could be a function
of any number of variables, such as device type, education level, or
financial desperation.

92. Jolls, supra note 89, at 656–57 (discussing Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth.,
181 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1999)).
93. Id. at 657 (discussing Banks v. City of Albany, 953 F. Supp. 28, 33–36
(N.D.N.Y 1997)).
94. See generally Blum, supra note 67. Consider Fama, for example, a company
that purports to be able to utilize AI to “identify threats related to sexual harassment,
discrimination, theft of sensitive information, or other types of people risk that could
destabilize your organization,” or to provide “role specific screening packages [that]
can help you identify those individuals likely to excel in the organization.” Product
Overview, FAMA, https://www.fama.io/product-overview/ [https://perma.cc/9MFFFF63].
95. See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 21, at 164–65.
96. See id.
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The Impact of Bad Data: Biased, Partial, or Wrong

When the training data is unrepresentative of the environment it
will operate in, discriminatory outcomes can occur. This can come
about through a host of issues. The dataset itself may be overinclusive or under-inclusive of certain segments of the population,
creating sample-size issues that produce disparate impacts. 97 The
dataset could contain preexisting biases that lead the AI system to
inherit society’s biases, habits, and beliefs, and perpetuate already
persisting discrimination. 98 For example, consider an AI system
meant to predict the likelihood of an employee’s future success by
learning from the dataset of previous achievements. The dataset of
those previous achievements “might be tilted against minorities given
their lack of past success because of a harsh work environment
resulting from discriminatory attitudes, or the lack of minority hiring
altogether.” 99 Not only does this AI system rely on faulty data, the
context in which the data was collected and the present circumstances
may have changed dramatically, reducing the predictive worth of the
dataset. 100 “Confounding covariates,” such as the use of ZIP codes to
predict the worthiness of applicants, can drive an AI system to
produce racist outcomes, even though the system was never taught
what race is. 101 Also known as proxies or “redundant encodings,”
confounding covariates can render significant efforts to counteract
discrimination wholly ineffective, and ultimately produce disparate
impacts. 102 In other words, relying on confounding covariates raises
the possibility that AI systems could resort to making decisions based
on a datapoint that disproportionately harms one group over another,
even if the AI system was never taught concepts of race, gender,
sexuality, age, or other protected characteristics.
Bad data can also lead to faulty decision-making processes and
conclusions. 103 In particular, missing and inaccurate data can

97. See id. at 171.
98. See Batya Friedman & Helen Nissenbuam, Bias in Computer Systems, 14
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. SYSTEMS 330 (1996).
99. Tal Z. Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH.
L. REV. 1375, 1392 (2014).
100. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 45, at 684–85.
101. See Zarsky, supra note 99, at 1394–95.
102. See Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1036–
37 (2017).
103. See generally James T. Graves et al., Big Data and Bad Data: On the
Sensitivity of Security Policy to Imperfect Information, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 117 (2016)
(discussing the myriad ways that bad data leads to bad decisions in the security
context).
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potentially lead an AI system to draw invalid inferences. 104 For
example, consider a machine learning algorithm that evaluates
applications to higher education institutions.
Historically
underrepresented minorities at colleges and universities may be
denied admission simply because of their preexisting lack of
representation in the data sample. The same can be said for nontraditional applicants with uncommon life trajectories. These kinds of
historically underrepresented applicants may not be evaluated as
holistically by an AI system as they would be by a human admissions
officer. In the best-case scenario, over time those errors would be
corrected by the machine learning algorithm’s feedback loop. But
even in that situation, there would nonetheless remain a potentially
lengthy interim period where invalid inferences are drawn from
lacking data inputs. By requiring real transparency of the sources of
the data, such problems could be reduced or avoided. 105 Under the
Transparency Model proposed here, the data provider has to critically
scrutinize the data they use to train the AI system and ensure that it
will not continue to perpetuate historically discriminatory imbalances.

4.

Discrimination in the Feedback

AI systems can be taught to reach discriminatory or biased
conclusions not only from faulty underlying datasets, but also during
the feedback phase. This can occur in two ways: through a
transmission of the trainer’s biases, or through a failure on the part of
the trainer to correct the AI’s mistakes. The former of these is not
the consequence of the AI system or the underlying data as much as it
is on the shoulders of discriminatory human conduct. However
nefarious this conduct is, it is not as relevant to the scope of this work.
In the latter case, the AI system learns using a dataset that is not per
se discriminatory — it is the process used to teach the system that
causes it to produce biased results. The trainer may adjust the
algorithm to match the dataset in such a way that it “overfits” the
dataset, forcing the AI system to create arbitrary connections that
result from the randomness of the feedback it received. 106 In such a
case, the AI system creates rather than identifies patterns in ways that
do not recognize proper cause and effect, inferring false
interrelationships between variables that are, in fact, not related at all.

104. See id. at 119–20.
105. See Zarsky, supra note 99, at 1395.
106. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 45, at 714.
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Unmoored and Independent AI Systems that Autonomously
Seek Data

The feature that most distinguishes AI systems from traditional
algorithms is their independence: AI systems are capable of searching
for new relevant datasets from areas such as social networks, internet
sites, blogs, and other data that exists online. 107 Therefore, once in
operation, an AI system can become unleashed from and move
beyond its original training data as it collects new information. An
unrestrained AI system can create what is known as “arbitrariness by
algorithm” — it might predict outcomes based on inferences,
correlations, and groupings of different individuals together according
to data found online, which might be filled with arbitrary and
misleading datapoints. 108 Consider, for example, a data provider that
initially exposes and trains an AI system to hire or promote
employees without considering gender or race. As the AI system
continues to evolve on its own, receiving employee data regarding
hiring and promotions, it could begin to identify other factors such as
whether employees play football or dance ballet. Because these other
characteristics are often tied to race, gender, sexuality, class, and the
like, these unrelated variables might lead the system to become
biased on the basis of these characteristics, which will ultimately
result in biased outcomes. Even though anti-discrimination statutes
clearly prohibit AI data providers and trainers from teaching an AI
system to purposely discriminate, that the system will autonomously
become prejudicial is a very real possibility — one that falls within the
parameters of anti-discrimination legislation because of the disparate
impact that the AI system would ultimately produce. 109

6.

From Theory to Practice: The Inability of Existing Laws to
Control AI Systems

While it is theoretically possible that the disparate impact doctrine
could apply broadly to improperly assembled datasets, there is reason
to conclude that it may not. Perhaps the AI system operator could
escape liability by claiming a business necessity, a defense to disparate
impact that arises where the practice at issue is the only way of

107. See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 12, at 2223–29.
108. See Zarsky, supra note 99, at 1408–09.
109. See Friedman & Nissenbuam, supra note 98, at 330, 335 (discussing
“Emergent Bias” that arises from the use of the computer system, rather than being
preexisting or technical).
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accomplishing a worthwhile objective. 110 In the case of an AI
operator, she might demonstrate that the data used to train the AI
system contained necessary variables related to the AI’s objective,
thereby potentially defeating a disparate impact claim. 111 Barocas
and Selbst argue, for example, that the collection of vast amounts of
data to use in the employment context is not effectively counteracted
by the requirements of anti-discrimination legislation in the
employment sector. 112 Additionally, the disparate impact doctrine
cannot address the myriad issues that are likely to arise from faulty
data in AI — the doctrine has been relegated to specific practices
such as employment, housing, and lending practices. 113 Besides,
many practices can produce outcomes that may not rise to prohibited
discrimination but nonetheless offend society. For example, one
study demonstrated that, when a user’s “ad preference settings were
set to female, a user saw ‘fewer instances of an ad related to highpaying jobs than [when preferences were set] to male,’”
demonstrating that somewhere in the system, the AI made a biased
connection between higher earnings and male job applicants. 114
It is vital to recognize that even though these problems are
detrimental to society and risk increasing inequality, it is possible to
train AI systems to reduce the potential for bias. 115 Rather than
perpetuating existing biases and disparities, an AI system could learn
to avoid such outcomes by being taught to identify where bias or
discrimination may be driving particular decisions. 116 One AI system
could even audit another to “ensure that [data] is used only for its
intended purpose,” and to “identify algorithmic outcomes that are
unfair and discriminatory.” 117

110. See Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 244 (2005) (explaining the
business necessity defense).
111. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 45, at 666.
112. See generally Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19.
113. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 701, 704–05 (2006) (arguing that the disparate impact doctrine has had
limited impact).
114. Desai & Kroll, supra note 28, at 17–18.
115. Lehr & Ohm, supra note 45, at 704–05.
116. Philip Hacker & Bilyana Petkova, Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data:
Transparency, Inequality, and New Regulatory Frontiers, 15 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 1, 13 (2017) (describing anecdotal evidence of Amazon charging higher prices
for Mac users than Windows users, suggesting that because the average Mac user is
wealthier than a PC user, income inequality is reduced).
117. Andrea Scripa Els, Note, Artificial Intelligence as a Digital Privacy Protector,
31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 217, 224 (2017).
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Examples and Consequences of Discriminatory Behavior by AI
Systems

In 2016, Microsoft released Tay, its new social media AI system,
with great fanfare. 118 Less than a day later, Microsoft apologized and
removed Tay from Twitter. 119 During that single day, Tay had
learned how to be racist, genocidal, and a white supremacist. 120 As it
turns out, “a small subset” of Twitter users “exploited a vulnerability”
in the program, 121 apparently a problematic “repeat after me”
function. 122 Though this may seem like an isolated incident, it is
hardly the only instance of misbehavior. 123 It also highlights the
broader risks regarding artificial intelligence and discrimination. 124
Furthermore, while Tay is an obvious example of how AI
applications can malfunction if given the wrong training data (i.e.
speech by online trolls 125), in other instances it is much more difficult
to trace whether the undesired result came from a discriminatory
dataset or a prejudicial trainer. For example, consider an algorithm

118. Abby Ohlheiser, Trolls Turned Tay, Microsoft’s Fun Millennial AI Bot, Into a
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
25,
2016),
Maniac,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/03/24/the-internetturned-tay-microsofts-fun-millennial-ai-bot-into-a-genocidal-maniac/
[https://perma.cc/K6XZ-SVY5].
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Peter Lee, Learning from Tay’s Introduction, OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG
(Mar.
25,
2016),
https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2016/03/25/learning-taysintroduction/ [https://perma.cc/CT9A-VYHJ].
122. Ohlheiser, supra note 118.
123. See Jana Kasperkevic, Google Says Sorry for Racist Auto-Tag in Photo App,
GUARDIAN
(July
1,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/01/google-sorry-racist-auto-tagphoto-app [https://perma.cc/SUY9-XJC3]; Matt Day, How LinkedIn’s Search Engine
May Reflect a Gender Bias, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016),
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/microsoft/how-linkedins-search-engine-mayreflect-a-bias/ [https://perma.cc/F3U2-HVZZ].
124. See Stephen Buranyi, Rise of the Racist Robots — How AI Is Learning All
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
8,
2017),
Our
Worst
Impulses,
https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/aug/08/rise-of-the-racist-robots-how-aiis-learning-all-our-worst-impulses [https://perma.cc/D3VK-ND5G]; Christina Couch,
Ghosts
in
the
Machine,
PBS
(Oct.
25,
2017),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/tech/ai-bias/
[https://perma.cc/WUP9-JBRD];
Sophia Chen, AI Research Is in Desperate Need of an Ethical Watchdog, WIRED
(Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/ai-research-is-in-desperate-need-of-anethical-watchdog/ [https://perma.cc/T6BS-MYYU].
125. A troll is someone who “antagonize[s] (others) online by deliberately posting
inflammatory, irrelevant, or offensive comments or other disruptive content.” Troll,
(Online
ed.
2019),
https://www.merriamMERRIAM-WEBSTER
webster.com/dictionary/troll [https://perma.cc/2L8Q-5948].
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that decides SAT prep courses should cost twice as much in Asianmajority communities than others — is it doing so because those
communities are Asian, or for some other reason? 126 What if a
disparity occurs because of the underlying sample size, such as facial
recognition applications that identify white male faces much more
effectively than women and other races? 127
Discriminatory outcomes pose both legal and reputational dangers
to AI systems operators. Where statutes prohibit business practices
that cause a disparate impact for protected groups without a valid
reason, such as a business necessity defense, an AI operator should
ensure that its systems are run in compliance with those statutes.
Additionally, the specter of discrimination can also lead to serious
reputational damage, which should incentivize AI operators to
consider possible vulnerabilities in their AI training process that
could produce discriminatory outcomes.
The above sections demonstrate how exposing an AI system to
biased, incomplete, or wrong data can result in discrimination. As AI
systems become cheaper to implement and more widely used, these
risks will increase. Technology firms should consider these risks when
developing AI systems and avoid inappropriate uses of data that may
violate anti-discrimination laws or result in an AI malfunction that
could damage their reputation. The Transparency Model would help
increase public trust by educating users, and incentivize the industry
to scrutinize and verify the data its AI systems depend on.
There is one significant barrier to understanding how and when it is
more likely for an AI system to produce discriminatory results: lack
of transparency. Currently, consumers are unable to know with
certainty whether a given negative outcome resulted from an AI
system built on biased data, or due to some other reason. The next
section examines how we can resolve this issue by grounding the
public’s right to an explanation in a right to privacy. Privacy rights
function both as a means to understanding whether discrimination is
occurring, and as an end in themselves so that individuals can
confidently ascertain whether private information about them is being
misused in ways that they did not foresee. By encouraging

126. Julia Angwin & Jeff Larson, The Tiger Mom Tax: Asians Are Nearly Twice as
Likely to Get a Higher Price from Princeton Review, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 1, 2015),

https://www.propublica.org/article/asians-nearly-twice-as-likely-to-get-higher-pricefrom-princeton-review [https://perma.cc/ZGY6-SE3G].
127. See Couch, supra note 124 (discussing the popular benchmark Labeled Faces
in the Wild used by many well-known tech firms to measure algorithm performance
for facial recognition and the lack of diversity in the sample).
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transparency and scrutiny of AI systems, the Transparency Model can
help consumers hold operators accountable, such that they will better
prevent discriminatory results and avoid privacy violations.
B.

Data and Privacy: Invasive and Pervasive Data

The ways that AI trainers use data pertaining to individuals
invariably raises privacy concerns. Individuals are not always aware
of the sheer magnitude of data that others possess about them, and
therefore likely are not aware of how this data is used by AI systems.
Privacy plays a pivotal role in the Transparency Model for two
interlocking reasons. For one, transparency would incentivize the AI
industry to avoid violating societal privacy expectations. Conjointly,
transparency can empower individuals to better control their data,
and will enable them to advocate for their data privacy more
effectively.
AI systems cannot reliably function without the huge amounts of
data used to train them. At present, there is no shortage of data that
relates to the most personal details about almost all people. 128 Some
companies, such as Acxiom, make data available to individual users
without a special request; others, such as Facebook, require that
consumers send requests specifically to Facebook before it will
release the data it has collected on them. 129 Consumers are often
unaware of the detailed information that AI system operators
possess, which is drawn from multiple sources. This creates two
layers of secrecy: Not only do consumers not know what data exists,
but they also do not know how AI systems use it. Thus, consumers
cannot opt out of being “judged” by a computer, nor are they able to
control the information that others hold about them. This section
explores the role that privacy can play in helping policymakers craft a
response to the proliferation of AI in all aspects of our society.
Following this analysis of privacy, Part III discusses the Transparency
Model in detail, which will help educate consumers and incentivize AI
system operators (and others) to consider what types of data they

128. Natasha Singer, What You Don’t Know About How Facebook Uses Your
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
11,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/technology/facebook-privacy-hearings.html
[https://perma.cc/D48E-UETK].
129. Compare ABOUT THE DATA BY ACXIOM, https://aboutthedata.com/portal
[https://perma.cc/EBA6-BLM9], with Louise Matsakis, What to Look for in Your
Facebook Data — And How to Find It, WIRED (Mar. 28, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/download-facebook-data-how-to-read/
[https://perma.cc/HL3S-3TJY].
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should use in training AI, and, on a more fundamental level, how
much of that data they should use.
Many scholars have recognized that privacy is difficult to define as
a legal concept. 130 For purposes of this Article, the notion of privacy
focuses on the psychological aspects of the term and, more
specifically, the perceived personal “balloon,” or a private sphere,
which centers on autonomy, freedom, and the creation of
relationships. 131 Accordingly, this Article envisions privacy in a
unique way by relying on the conceptual balloon of privacy that
surrounds each and every one of us. 132
Efforts to regulate data collection and to protect privacy have
recently become more commonplace and comprehensive. The
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
which took effect on May 25, 2018, calls for protecting privacy rights
in the collection, use, and maintenance of individual data and imposes
these same mandatory obligations on U.S. firms that have commercial
relationships with European firms or citizens. 133 The U.S. Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and the Office of the Attorney General of
California have recognized the importance of privacy and the need to
design policies that protect privacy as part of the data industry’s inner
processes of production, known as Privacy by Design. 134

130. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393, 393
(1977) (“The concept of ‘privacy’ is elusive and ill defined. Much ink has been spilled
in trying to clarify its meaning.”). But see James Q. Whitman, The Two Western
Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1153–55 (2004)
(arguing that the fact that privacy is embarrassingly difficult to define and differs
from one culture to another undermines the importance of keeping privacy as a tool
to protect personhood). According to Daniel Solove, the multitude of definitions
produced by scholars can be narrowed down to six basic conceptualizations of
privacy: (1) the right to be let alone; (2) limited access to the self; (3) secrecy; (4)
control of personal information; (5) personhood; and (6) intimacy. Daniel J. Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1094 (2002).
131. See James Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 326–
31 (1975). See generally Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, To Read or Not to Read: Privacy

Within Social Networks, the Entitlement of Employees to a Virtual Private Zone,
and the Balloon Theory, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 53, 80–86 (2014) (introducing the balloon

theory).
132. Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 131, at 83–84.
133. See generally Council Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 27 Apr. 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2018 O.J. (L 119), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679 [https://perma.cc/AE85-XBKD].
134. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 22–23 (Mar.
2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-
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Privacy rights are also well-recognized in international law. Article
12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family,
home, or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks.” 135 This text is memorialized in
Article 17 of the International Convention On Civil and Political
Rights of 1966. 136 Similarly, Article 8(1) of the European Convention
on Human Rights ensures that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for
his private and family life, his home and his correspondence,” and
allows for interference with this heralded right to privacy in extremely
limited circumstances. 137
One does not need to provide a precise definition of privacy or
determine whether a right to privacy exists under U.S. law in order to
advocate that American consumers are owed proper privacy
protections. For one, a reasonable expectation of privacy is justified
through psychological approaches, such as the aforementioned
balloon of privacy or the so-called Magnet Field Theory, which
suggests that there is a sphere of privacy that always surrounds
humans, even in cyberspace arenas such as social networks. 138

commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-changerecommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQF5-AG6A]; CAL.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., PRIVACY ON THE GO:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
THE
MOBILE ECOSYSTEM
4
(Jan.
2013),
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/privacy_on_the_go.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZPC7-Z29E] (“Our recommendations, which in many places offer
greater protection than afforded by existing law, are intended to encourage all
players in the mobile marketplace to consider privacy implications at the outset of
the design process.”).
135. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948),
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html
[https://perma.cc/N2DM-YPRF].
136. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/16-12-1996_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WQ56-26T7].
137. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art.
8,
Nov.
4,
1950,
213
U.N.T.S.
222,
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BBEEDJ6]. For a discussion of the meaning of private life under the treaty, see IVANA
ROAGNA, COUNCIL OF EUROPE HUMAN RIGHTS HANDBOOKS: PROTECTING THE
RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE UNDER THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION
OF
HUMAN
RIGHTS
12
(2012),
https://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/Roagna2012_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P7JFSCK5].
138. Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 131 (describing the psychological importance of
having a private sphere surrounding individuals in Cyberspace — as the Balloon
Theory or the Magnet Field Theory — and claiming that privacy is justified with
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Additionally, a reasonable right to privacy can be justified for
efficiency reasons. 139 Data breaches and the release or compromise
of data induce anxiety in the subjects of that compromised data.140
Under U.S. law, communal expectations of privacy can stem from
statutes. 141 However, individuals also have expectations to privacy
that are normative in nature. 142 These stem from what people choose
to divulge to others, and what they anticipate will happen to that
information. Those normative expectations can erode over time — as
AI systems become more complex and more capable of drawing upon
multiple sources of data to paint new pictures of who someone is as a
person, it is worth exploring whether, and to what extent, AI systems
violate both statutory requirements and normative expectations of
privacy. 143 Proper privacy protections depend primarily on two types
of procedures: gaining informed consent for data collection, and the
anonymization of collected data. 144
When AI systems use massive amounts of data drawn from
multiple sources, the potential for privacy violations increases. In
certain areas of the economy, heightened data protections apply
because policymakers decided that those specific fields warrant
heightened privacy protections, which surmount other considerations
such as the availability of cheaper products, or more efficient

respect to employees particularly for efficiency reasons, such as maximizing
productivity and creating positive incentives).
139. Id.; see also Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Ben Zion Lahav, Public Interest vs.

Private Lives — Affording Public Figures Privacy in the Digital Era: The Three
Principles Filtering Model, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 975, 978–79 (2017) (discussing the

importance of privacy, especially in the digital era, in regards to public figures);
Shlomit Yanisky Ravid & Amy Mittelman, Gender Biases in Cyberspace: A TwoStage Model, the New Arena of Wikipedia and Other Websites, 26 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L.J. 381, 401–12 (2015) (examining the “price” women pay
when being discriminated against, and the harm suffered from harassment in the
virtual spheres, such as in cases of revenge porn).
140. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of
Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 741 (2018) (stating that most courts dismiss
data breach lawsuits because they fail to allege harm, and that this difficulty largely
stems from the fact that data breach harms are intangible, risk-oriented, and diffuse
for a court to assess risk and anxiety in a concrete and coherent way).
141. Colin Shaff, Is the Court Allergic to Katz? Problems Posed by New Methods
of Electronic Surveillance to the “Reasonable-Expectation-of-Privacy” Test, 23 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 409, 438–39 (2014).
142. See Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 131, at 84.
143. Id. at 99–100.
144. Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End Run Around Procedural
Privacy Protections, 57 COMM. ACM 31, 31 (2014) (“Privacy protections for the past
40 years have concentrated on two types of procedural mitigation: informed consent
and anonymization.”).

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

2019]

459

services. 145
In order to protect against violations of societal
expectations of privacy, AI operators should make transparent the
sorts of data they use to train AI systems, where the data was
collected, how it is used, and how it is protected. Further, AI
operators ought to take steps to ensure that such private data is not
misused in ways that can trample privacy expectations or produce
unfair outcomes.

1.

AI and U.S. Privacy “Islands”: Healthcare, Finance, and
Children

This section discusses privacy in the context of “islands” of wellprotected rights under U.S. law. First, we describe the advances to
which AI systems have contributed in the healthcare and
pharmaceutical industry and highlight the importance of data privacy
in that arena. Second, we discuss how statutes require privacy with
respect to children and education and note that those requirements
reduce the ability of AI systems to increase in prominence in that
sector. Third, we examine statutory requirements of privacy and
disclosure in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Fourth, we
identify general normative expectations of privacy and advocate for
various manifestations of those expectations that AI trainers should
consider when deciding what data to use in training AI systems.

a.

AI in the Healthcare Field

The medical sector is bursting with developing AI systems. 146
Applications such as diabetes monitoring, 147 medical image

145. See Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 131, at 99–101.
146. Daniel Faggella, Machine Learning Healthcare Applications — 2018 and
Beyond, TECHEMERGENCE, https://www.techemergence.com/machine-learninghealthcare-applications/ [https://perma.cc/L8CS-W7AD]; see also Charles Ornstein &
Katie Thomas, Sloan Kettering’s Cozy Deal with Start-Up Ignites a New Uproar,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/health/memorialsloan-kettering-cancer-paigeai.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fhealth&action=click&contentCollec
tion=health&region=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement
=2&pgtype=sectionfront [https://perma.cc/VQ4K-3SYJ] (discussing an artificial
intelligence start-up founded by three insiders at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer
Center, with $25 million in venture capital and the promise that it might one day
transform how cancer is diagnosed. The company, Paige.AI, is one of many that
apply artificial intelligence to healthcare).
147. Medtronic and IBM Watson Health Partner to Develop New Ways to Tackle
MEDTRONIC,
http://www.medtronic.com/us-en/about/news/ibmDiabetes,
diabetes.html [https://perma.cc/FP4S-B6TR].
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analysis, 148 diagnosis of cancer and other illnesses, 149 and
individualized medicinal regimens 150 are just the tip of the iceberg
with respect to possible medical applications of AI. One consultant
estimates that AI systems could generate up to a hundred-billion
dollars in annual value in the U.S. healthcare system alone. 151 A
McKinsey Global Institute publication stated that AI in healthcare
could lead to quicker diagnoses, better treatment plans, and improved
health insurance. 152 One significant driver of AI development in this
field has been the ability to collect more and more medical data. 153
One potential issue is whether the data collected is recorded in
standardized formats — presently, much data is recorded
idiosyncratically, according to the needs of the collector, limiting its
potential use. 154 Regulation of medical devices poses significant
challenges to developers seeking to train AI systems with compliant

148. Project InnerEye — Medical Imaging AI to Empower Clinicians, MICROSOFT,
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/medical-image-analysis/
[https://perma.cc/CKP4-HM6B]; see also Watson Oncology, MEMORIAL SLOAN
KETTERING
CANCER
CTR.,
https://www.mskcc.org/about/innovativecollaborations/watson-oncology [https://perma.cc/D7SW-M8KG].
149. Cooper Katz, AI Created to Transform Cancer Diagnosis and Treatment by
Applying Artificial Intelligence to Pathology, BUS. WIRE (Feb. 5, 2018),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180205005557/en/Paige.AI-CreatedTransform-Cancer-Diagnosis-Treatment-Applying [https://perma.cc/H49B-GWJX]
(“Currently, highly-trained pathologists interpret numerous individual glass slides
using a microscope to analyze tissues and cells. For instance, there can be as many as
60 slides in one breast biopsy, though often only a few are relevant to the diagnosis.
The manual nature of this work is inherently inefficient and can contribute to
diagnostic variability. Technology to convert glass slides to digital images has existed
for over a decade, but it has not been broadly adopted because digitization alone
does not allow pathologists to improve workflow.” AI technology could provide the
missing link to help pathologists make decisions with greater speed, accuracy,
objectivity and reproducibility — all at a lower cost.); see also Ornstein & Thomas,
supra note 146 (arguing that the goal of using AI tehnology is to provide predictive
data and help cancer physicians around the country).
150. Jennifer Kite-Powell, Artificial Intelligence and Data Driven Medicine,
FORBES
(July
27,
2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jenniferhicks/2016/07/27/artificial-intelligence-and-datadriven-medicine/#740a31c73069 [https://perma.cc/U689-5M5Y].
151. Jamie Cattell et al., How Big Data Can Revolutionize Pharmaceutical R&D,
MCKINSEY (Apr. 2013), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-andmedical-products/our-insights/how-big-data-can-revolutionize-pharmaceutical-r-andd [https://perma.cc/977P-4ZPF].
152. See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 1, at 63.
153. ResearchKit & CareKit, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/researchkit/
[https://perma.cc/63E5-ZNU2].
154. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 1, at 64.
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data, 155 so much so that AI systems have been created to reduce
regulatory risk with medical data. 156 This is still a nascent field, and
its effectiveness is not set in stone. Watson, IBM’s AI infrastructure,
for example, has recommended incorrect cancer treatments at times
and is often disagreed with by doctors around the world. 157
Congress passed the Healthcare Insurance Portability and
Accessibility Act of 1996 (HIPAA) to address the issue of data
privacy in the healthcare sector. 158 There are two primary aspects of
HIPAA: the Privacy Rule, which governs the content of data, and the
Security Rule, which concerns how an entity protects data. 159 The
Privacy Rule regulates individually identifiable health information
collected by healthcare providers. 160 It lists situations where a
healthcare provider may use or disclose health information, and
requires protocols and procedures that protect health information
from unauthorized access, use, or disclosure. 161 The Privacy Rule is
designed to balance individual privacy rights against the societal goals
of “oversight, research, law enforcement, public health and safety.”162
The Security Rule only applies to protected health information in
electronic format, and has three central tenets — that the data is kept
confidential, available to authorized persons only, and that the
integrity of the data is assured. 163 Unlike the Privacy Rule, “the
Security Rule created the standards for ensuring that only those who
should have access to [electronic protected health information] will in
fact have access.” 164

155. See Jonathan Kay, How Do You Regulate a Self-Improving Algorithm?,
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
25,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/10/algorithms-future-of-healthcare/543825/ [https://perma.cc/W5FW-85P9].
156. See APTIBLE, https://www.aptible.com/ [https://perma.cc/GNW3-YX7A].
157. See Carly Casey Ross & Ike Swetlitz, IBM’s Watson Supercomputer

Recommended ‘Unsafe and Incorrect’ Cancer Treatments, Internal Documents
Show, STAT (July 25, 2018),
https://www.statnews.com/2018/07/25/ibm-watson-recommended-unsafe-incorrecttreatments/ [https://perma.cc/5JH4-TJ6N].
158. See generally C. STEPHEN REDHEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43991,
HIPAA PRIVACY, SECURITY, ENFORCEMENT, AND BREACH NOTIFICATION
STANDARDS (2015).
159. Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334 (Feb. 20,
2003) (adopting “standards for the security of electronic protected health
information”).
160. 45 C.F.R. § 164.500 et seq. (2019).
161. Id. § 164.506.
162. REDHEAD, supra note 158, at 3.
163. Id. at 11.
164. Id.
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If an entity decides to use or disclose protected health information,
it must do so only to the extent necessary, though there are numerous
exceptions to that “minimum necessity” standard. 165 Generally, the
minimum necessity determination is conducted at a policy and
procedure level, rather than for each distinct use or disclosure of
For example, a healthcare
protected health information. 166
organization would identify persons and departments that require
protected information and limit their access to the nature of the
information needed. Where the protected health information is
electronic,
HIPAA’s
Security
Rule
requires
reasonable
administrative, technical and physical procedures to prevent
unauthorized access, use, or disclosure of protected health
information. 167 For example, in 2017, Metro Community Provider
Network agreed to pay a $400,000 fine following a data breach in one
of its hospitals that resulted from failures to secure patients’ data and
conduct a risk analysis, which would have revealed the glaring
vulnerabilities in the hospital’s data security program. 168
For an AI system to be deployed in the healthcare context, the data
that it is developed on must be HIPAA-compliant. 169 For example,
when IBM engages with Memorial Sloan Kettering to provide
Watson to help diagnose tumors, the data used to train Watson on
how to identify tumors must have been gathered in compliance with
HIPAA. However, HIPAA’s approach to privacy fails to address the
issue of de-anonymization, as made possible by computing power and
massive quantities of data. 170 Consider an example from the mid1990s to demonstrate the fact that even anonymous information
stripped of identifiers can easily be de-anonymized to reveal
individuals within datasets. 171 In Massachusetts, Group Insurance
Company (“GIC”), a government agency, decided to release hospital
records for every state employee in the government’s health
165. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) (2019).
166. REDHEAD, supra note 158, at 6.
167. Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334 (Feb. 20,
2003).
168. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Overlooking Risks
Leads
to
Breach,
$400,000
Settlement
(Apr.
12,
2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/04/12/overlooking-risks-leads-to-breachsettlement.html [https://perma.cc/8Q7U-DDEW ].
169. See generally Abner Weintraub, Consider HIPAA When Using AI &
Machine Learning, MEDSTACK (Nov. 14, 2017), https://medstack.co/blog/considerhipaa-using-machine-learning/ [https://perma.cc/Q3W2-ZBZZ].
170. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1703–06 (2010).
171. Id. at 1719–20.
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insurance program. 172 While names, addresses, and social security
numbers were stripped from the data, patients’ zip codes, birth dates,
and sexes were not. 173 A graduate student purchased the voter rolls
of Cambridge, Massachusetts (where the Governor of Massachusetts
lived), which contained the names, addresses, zip code, birth date, and
sex of every voter. 174 By combining the voter dataset with the
hospital dataset, the student was able to identify the Governor’s
This
health records, including diagnoses and prescriptions. 175
illustrates the problem of relying on anonymity as a total solution to
ensuring health privacy — whenever an AI system is trained using
multiple datasets, there is a very real possibility that the system will
combine the datasets and arrive at a new base of knowledge that
violates the requirements of HIPAA. One study concluded that 87%
of the population can be uniquely identified merely with one’s zip
code, birthdate, and sex. 176 While other studies have found a slightly
lower likelihood of identification, 177 that there is still any heightened
chance of identification is problematic. It is vital to realize that the
more data an AI system accumulates, the more likely it is that
anonymous data can be de-anonymized.
Considering that datasets may be combined, transferred, or split
up, AI systems that operate in the healthcare space should make the
sources of their data transparent. This will give patients and other
stakeholders the ability to determine whether anonymity is
jeopardized and how medical data is used or transferred. Absent
such transparency, we risk the possibility that others may be able to
match multiple datasets, dissect the datapoints, and quickly pinpoint a
particular individual who should have remained anonymous.
Two further issues bear special mention here. First, AI systems
trained to diagnose illnesses and diseases require huge amounts of
historical medical data, which is usually held by and is accessible
through large firms and entities, whose interests may not align with
the public’s interests in welfare or privacy. 178 This misalignment may
be amplified when the data was collected by nonprofit organizations,
such as public hospitals, and transferred to for-profit entities. 179 In

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 1719.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1720.
Id. at 1719.
Id.
See, e.g., Ornstein & Thomas, supra note 146.
See, e.g., id.
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these situations, the arrangement between the public seller and
private buyer may contain exclusivity clauses, which would limit the
ability of the public hospital to share the data with other actors
(thereby potentially hurting public welfare), or grant the for-profit
firm exclusive rights to determine when and how the data is
transferred to third parties (thereby implicating privacy concerns).180
These issues recently came to light following revelations of an
agreement between the company Paige.AI and Memorial Sloan
Kettering, regarding the use of millions of patient tissue slides, which
Paige.AI would use to train AI systems to make diagnoses.181
Through the use of this data, Paige.AI was able to obtain a market
advantage over its competitors. 182

b.

AI for Children and Education

AI systems are not only used to diagnose diseases, hire employees,
or predict creditworthiness. They are also increasingly used in toys
and applications for children. Recently, a doll developed by Mattel
that included an AI system was withdrawn from the market following
privacy concerns regarding the effect it would have on child
development. 183 Another doll outfitted with an AI system can
apparently read children’s emotions, 184 while other systems can tutor
children. 185 Video games, a source of entertainment for millions of
children, are rife with AI programs that can create characters, adjust
the trajectory of the game to match the child’s response, and shape
the child’s understanding of the world. 186 In millions of homes, AI

See, e.g., id.
Id.
Id.
See Hayley Tsukayama, Mattel Has Canceled Plans for a Kid-Focused AI
Device that Drew Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2017),
180.
181.
182.
183.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/04/mattel-has-an-aidevice-to-soothe-babies-experts-are-begging-them-not-to-sellit/?utm_term=.8fee600e7aa1 [https://perma.cc/MB5U-ERYS].
184. See Timothy Revell, Smart Doll Fitted with AI Chip Can Read Your Child’s
Emotions,
NEW
SCIENTIST
(June
20,
2017),
https://www.newscientist.com/article/2137835-smart-doll-fitted-with-ai-chip-can-readyour-childs-emotions/ [https://perma.cc/5QZQ-74P3].
185. See Kumba Sennaar, The Artificial Intelligence Tutor — The Current
Possibilities of Smart Virtual Learning, TECHEMERGENCE (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://www.techemergence.com/artificial-intelligence-tutor-current-possibilitiessmart-virtual-learning/ [https://perma.cc/TJU6-7KUN].
186. See Harbing Lou, AI in Video Games: Toward a More Intelligent Game, SCI.
NEWS BLOG (Aug. 28, 2017), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/ai-video-gamestoward-intelligent-game/ [https://perma.cc/XC3K-2QKV].
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systems are on standby, waiting for a child to ask them a question.187
Depending on the specific use of these AI applications, they may run
afoul of privacy legislation that protects children. Further, as
discussed above, the specific vulnerability in AI systems is that data
accumulated over time may not have been collected in compliance
with privacy statutes, creating a risk that data held and used by the AI
programmers may come from an illegitimate source.
Congress has enacted numerous statutes that regulate data privacy
when it concerns children and education, and the Transparency
Model can help AI system stakeholders comply with them. The
collection of data on children and the potential negative
consequences of failing to protect children’s identities are some of the
main concerns that gave rise to the Fair Information Practice
Principles. 188 The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998
(COPPA) prohibits the collection of data about children under
thirteen without their parents’ consent. 189 The onus is on AI data
providers and trainers to ensure that the data they use to train AI
systems was not collected from children without their parents’
consent. 190 Moreover, data collectors must ensure that their data
does not “run away” from them to third parties or unknown entities,
as parents retain the right under COPPA to request destruction of the
data collected on their child. 191 These requirements imply that AI
trainers should be aware of how their datasets were collected, and on
whom they have stored data.
COPPA created numerous obligations for multiple entities in the
AI design process, including the AI system operators that create
applications marketed towards children. Operators have to make the
data they are collecting transparent, and must reveal how they collect

187. See Allison Aubrey & Michaeleen Doucleff, Alexa, Are You Safe for My
Kids?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-

shots/2017/10/30/559863326/alexa-are-you-safe-for-my-kids [https://perma.cc/5DUUV6WV].
188. See F.T.C., PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 4–6, 12–14 (June
1998), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-reportcongress/priv-23a.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWL6-NQEY].
The Fair Information
Practice Principles were early attempts to codify principles concerning the collection
of information on children. See generally id.
189. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012).
190. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule: A Six-Step Compliance Plan
for Your Business, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/businesscenter/guidance/childrens-online-privacy-protection-rule-six-step-compliance
[https://perma.cc/TWN5-7ZVH].
191. 16 C.F.R. § 312.6 (2019).
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and use it. 192 Operators also have to disclose whether they have sold
the dataset to other operators, and the parents would have to consent
to that. 193 The proposed Transparency Model, therefore, fits squarely
within the requirements of COPPA and would help operators in this
space comply with their already existing legal obligations.

c.

Data, AI, and Consumer Finance

Financial services is the leading economic sector adopting AI
today, and it seems entities in this arena will continue to invest in AI
moving forward. 194 Lenders and financial institutions utilize AI
systems in their operations, 195 and the market is expanding so rapidly
that the impact is already noticeable. 196 AI systems utilize social
media platforms, handwriting style, and other unorthodox sources of
data to predict whether an applicant would be a trustworthy
borrower, among other things. 197 Financial institutions access loan
histories, credit reports, and purchase histories that detail consumer
behaviors on a granular level; AI systems incorporate these
traditional and untraditional data sources in an attempt to predict the
creditworthiness of potential borrowers. 198

192. Id. § 312.4.
193. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule: A Six-Step Compliance Plan
for Your Business, supra note 190.
194. See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 1, at 19.
195. Penny Crosman, Can AI Be Programmed to Make Fair Lending Decisions?,
AM. BANKER (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/can-ai-beprogrammed-to-make-fair-lending-decisions [https://perma.cc/8ZKZ-YGCX].
196. See Calvert, supra note 3 (noting that AI can be used to predict opportunity in
mergers and acquisitions, and discussing how AI “is influencing every aspect of the
global economy, including investment banking”); DELOITTE, supra note 3, at 2
(concluding that most of the financial industry uses digital tools).
197. Crosman, supra note 195; see also Julius Adebayo & Mikella Hurley, Credit
Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 148, 202 (2016); Schellmann &
Bellini, supra note 2.
198. BUSINESS CONSULTING INDUSTRY REPORT: JULY 2017, WELLS FARGO (July
2017),
https://www.wellsfargo.com/com/securities/markets/equity-sales/primeservices/publications/update-07-17/#data [https://perma.cc/F9P4-TNAV] (“[Firms]
collect and analyze big data and/or commission the data from the growing number of
tech firms and data aggregators that process such data into useable reports for
financial companies . . . . Sources include: meteorological and agricultural data;
energy supplies and usage (e.g., oil tankers and storage levels); shipping/freight
activity; construction activity; sensors from internet-connected machines or ‘smart’
devices (IoT sensors); pharmacological prescription data; e-commerce receipts and
credit-card transaction data; government data; and retail brick and mortar activity
(e.g., parking-lot photos). In addition, a large source of data consists of the
information that web services and mobile apps already receive from users and the
‘data exhaust’ from many tech companies (e.g., Foursquare = GPS foot traffic), as
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In short, AI systems not only track human behavior on- and offline, but also reach all sorts of financial decisions — determining
which loans consumers qualify for, what interest rates to charge,
where to invest certain funds, and whether a particular transaction
will be profitable. 199 One AI system claims to consider over twelve
thousand different variables concerning a credit applicant. 200 One
financial firm, Underwrite.AI, describes its use of machine learning:
The focus of machine learning today is to create computer
algorithms that learn from data and can make accurate predictions
of [creditworthiness] based upon the patterns deduced within the
data. Unlike traditional statistical modeling, the predictive models
of machine learning are generated by the computer algorithm, as
opposed to determinations made by statisticians based upon their
interpretation of the results of linear regression and related
techniques. 201

The combination of exponential increases in data collection with the
ability of AI systems to process massive amounts of data creates new
legal challenges and risks for financial institutions. 202
These emerging business practices must comply with the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and other regulations protecting
consumer borrowers. The FCRA requires consumer reporting

well as social media and social sentiment data, geolocation information, and online
pricing and inventory data . . . While anonymized data can be provided to customers
through contractual arrangements or an online services’ application program
interface (API), such data are also gathered through various methods, including
aerial surveillance (e.g., microsatellites, drones and thermal imaging), beacons, and
radio-frequency identification (RFID) sensors, and further analyzed using
sophisticated software and AI deep-learning technology.”).
199. Fortune Staff, How AI Is Shaking up Banking and Wall Street, FORTUNE
(Oct. 22, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/10/22/artificial-intelligence-ai-businessfinance/ [https://perma.cc/29ZU-C7SE].
200. Jon Walker, Artificial Intelligence Applications for Lending and Loan
TECHEMERGENCE
(Mar.
27,
2018),
Management,
https://www.techemergence.com/artificial-intelligence-applications-lending-loanmanagement/ [https://perma.cc/CQG3-BRK2].
201. About
Us,
UNDERWRITE.AI,
https://www.underwrite.ai/about
[https://perma.cc/HW4P-W2UZ].
202. Nico Grant, Hedge Funds, Beware: You Might Be Relying on Illegal Data
Feeds, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201712-07/hedge-funds-beware-you-might-be-relying-on-illegal-data-feeds
[https://perma.cc/NQL3-GZX8] (“‘[H]edge funds might get in trouble if they’re
buying data feeds from companies that didn’t get consumers’ approval to pass on
information like credit card transactions, online browsing and emailed receipts,’ said
Jonathan Streeter, who worked at the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of New York under Preet Bharara. The U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, in particular, could pursue enforcement cases.”).
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agencies to have procedures that ensure the credit process is “fair and
equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality,
accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information.” 203 It
also creates rights for consumers with respect to their credit reports,
and places requirements on entities that collect, distribute and use
these reports. 204 The FCRA’s primary aim is to require that
information about a credit applicant is accurate, and to ensure
procedures that can ameliorate errors. 205
Credit reports will typically include a massive amount of personally
identifying information. 206 When a consumer alleges that an aspect of
a credit report is inaccurate, the reporting agency must look into the
consumer’s claims. 207 Reporting agencies must also safeguard the
reports by releasing them only for specifically enumerated purposes
and by ensuring that the requester identifies him or herself, states the
purpose for why the information is needed, and manifests that the
information will only be used for permissible purposes. 208
Many challenges arise concerning where to store and how to treat
the underlying data that facilitates these financial decisions. Most AI
systems that evaluate credit applicants offer third-party services,
entailing some sort of exchange between the data owner and the data
holder, and raising concerns about which entities have access to what
data. 209 Of course, these third parties are responsible for maintaining
the security of the data. 210 Still, the third party may utilize the data to
improve its service and inform its operations for future applicants.

203.
204.
205.
206.

15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).

Id.

MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31666, FAIR CREDIT
REPORTING ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 6–7 (2013) (“[U]sually the
individual’s full name, Social Security number, address, telephone number, and
spouse’s name; financial status and employment information, including income,
spouse’s income, place, position, and tenure of employment, other sources of income,
duration and income in former employment; credit history, including types of credit
previously obtained, names of previous credit grants, extent of previous credit, and
complete payment history; existing lines of credit, including payment habits and all
outstanding obligations; public record information, including pertinent newspaper
clippings, arrest and conviction records, bankruptcies, tax liens, and lawsuits; and
finally a listing of bureau subscribers that have previously asked for a credit report on
the individual.”).
207. Id. at 7.
208. Id. at 7–8.
209. Kate Berry, CFPB Catches Flak from Banks, Credit Unions on Risks of AI,
AM. BANKER (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpb-catchesflak-from-banks-credit-unions-on-risks-of-ai [https://perma.cc/R5TX-5MUQ].
210. Id.
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For example, maybe it would create an internal profile for
individuals, to identify that person across applications. This could
lead to situations where an applicant is rejected not because of
objective evidence, but because of previous determinations made by
the AI system. In other words, it is conceivable that a negative
determination for an individual based on a dataset could result in a
negative determination for that individual permanently. If the AI
system denies credit to someone who is actually creditworthy, and this
mistake is not corrected, it will be reinforced over time, causing
serious detriment to that person. The stakes involved thus support
our proposal that companies involved in this space act very cautiously
and ensure that people are not wrongfully excluded from the credit
marketplace.
It is also of note that the implementing regulation of the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) makes clear that “lenders who use
non-traditional factors in making credit determinations must
implement ‘empirically derived, demonstrably and statistically sound,
Moreover, “[t]hese tools must be
credit scoring systems.’” 211
‘developed and validated using accepted statistical principles and
methodology,’ and must be subject to ongoing evaluation and
By its terms, the ECOA requires measures of
review.” 212
transparency regarding the datasets used by AI systems. First, the
statute requires a “demonstrably” acceptable model, so the lender
must demonstrate that the underlying training conducted ensures the
system’s soundness. 213 More significantly, the statute requires the
system to be “subject to ongoing evaluation and review.”214
Presumably, the statute would only require transparency with respect
to regulators, and not necessarily the public at large. At a minimum,
however, the statute prohibits complete black box machine learning
systems that would make lending decisions without any accountability
or oversight. Considering that an AI system could violate antidiscrimination law even while lacking any prejudicial mindset, it
behooves trainers of AI systems to ensure that the data they use will
not “taint” the AI system. 215

211. David. C. Vladeck, Consumer Protection in an Era of Big Data Analytics, 42
OHIO N. U. L. REV. 493, 514 (2016).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Zarsky, supra note 99, at 1393–94.
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General Normative Expectations of Privacy

In previous sections, this Article discussed how legislation
addresses privacy and the kinds of requirements imposed on AI
stakeholders who work in specific economic sectors. Privacy is a
nebulous concept, and its precise definition and contours have been
extensively debated. 216 This work does not purport to treat every
detail of this complex topic. That said, this section of the Article aims
to show that even when no statute prohibits a particular AI
application because of privacy concerns, the industry can nonetheless
violate expectations of privacy as they exist normatively, and can also
erode those expectations over time as technology evolves. For
example, in 2006, AOL released twenty million search queries of
650,000 of its users. 217 While it removed individuals’ usernames and
IP addresses, reporters were quickly able to identify User
No. 4417749 based on the user’s three search queries: “landscapers in
Lilburn, Ga,” a few people with the last name “Arnold,” and “homes
sold in shadow lake subdivision gwinnett county Georgia.” 218 The
reporters successfully identified a sixty-two-year-old widow named
Thelma, who admitted she had also searched for topics such as “60
This
single men,” and “dog that urinates on everything.” 219
demonstrates that even data that was “anonymized” may not actually
have been so, or that this process may have occurred in an insufficient
manner.
Anonymization becomes a problem when huge datasets are
released to the public without regard to the implications of the
Mosaic Theory. 220 The Mosaic Theory posits that even where the
typical identifying characteristics of a person are obscured, such as
name, social security number, date of birth, address, etc., in a large
dataset one can de-anonymize someone probabilistically because of

216. Patricia Sanchez Abril, Selling Privacy, 2014 ANNUAL ACADEMY OF LEGAL
STUDIES
IN
BUSINESS
(ALSB)
CONFERENCE,
https://www.alsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/NP-2014-Selling-Privacy-Abril.pdf [https://perma.cc/HE6QGWLY] (understanding privacy through copyright regimes and the feasibility of
selling personal data); see also Joseph W. Jerome, Buying and Selling Privacy Big
Data’s Different Burdens and Benefits, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 47 (2013)
(arguing that big data is transforming individual privacy — and not in equal ways for
all, thus addressing the possibilities of buying and selling data).
217. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure
of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1717 (2010).
218. Id. at 1717–18.
219. Id.
220. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012).
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the minimal likelihood that someone else shares the combination of a
multitude of other characteristics. 221
Widespread adoption of AI systems could increase the potential of
de-anonymization. Presently, AI systems cannot function without
vast amounts of data, as they must have a sufficient number of
datapoints to effectively learn patterns and come to conclusions. In
other words, the proliferation of AI systems automatically increases
demand for large datasets, and the larger these datasets become, the
easier and more likely de-anonymization becomes. With this growth
in demand for big data, it is increasingly vital that AI operators fully
disclose the sorts of data they use and the sources of that data. This
would enable individuals to determine the various ways that data is
being used in their favor or to their detriment. Considering that
datasets are routinely transferred from one company to another,
which may or may not be completely unrelated, 222 absent
transparency it would be impossible for a consumer to know just how
much their reputation precedes them when they travel from one
website to another, one credit application to another, or one job to
another.

3.

Privacy by Design

Privacy by Design is the notion that throughout the design and
lifecycle of a product or service, privacy should play a prominent role
when considering various options. 223 There are seven “foundational
principles” of Privacy by Design, the first of which stating that privacy
initiatives should be “proactive not reactive, preventative not
remedial.” 224 In other words, privacy should be the default setting,
embedded into the design itself throughout the product’s entire
lifecycle. 225 The product should have fully functional privacy
221. Id. at 320 (“The mosaic theory requires courts to apply the Fourth
Amendment search doctrine to government conduct as a collective whole rather than
in isolated steps . . . . [It] is therefore premised on aggregation: it considers whether a
set of nonsearches aggregated together amount to a search because their collection
and subsequent analysis creates a revealing mosaic.”).
222. See, e.g., AnnaMaria Andriotis & Emily Glazer, Facebook & Financial Firms
Tussled for Years over Access to User Data, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-sought-access-to-financial-firms-customerdata-1537263000 [https://perma.cc/BBE8-LLUT] (reporting that Facebook received
financial data from some users who communicated with their banking institutions via
Facebook Messenger).
223. Eric Everson, Privacy by Design: Taking Ctrl of Big Data, 65 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 27, 28 (2016).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 31.
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protections with end to end security, and should be continuously
visible and transparent regarding user privacy. 226
Privacy by Design incorporates the “fair information practices
common in most privacy legislation in use today: notice, choice and
consent, proximity and locality, anonymity and pseudonymity,
security, and access and recourse.” 227 Privacy by Design offers an
efficient framework for an AI developer to ensure that the data used
to train an AI system is not compromised. Even though Privacy by
Design focuses on visibility and transparency, “there should not be
any confusion around the necessity to encrypt, obscure, or otherwise
properly protect data.” 228 Whether traditional personally identifying
data, user data, or other potentially sensitive data, there is an inherent
duty to safeguard the privacy interest in the data collected, stored, or
used. 229
For many years, the FTC has advocated for Privacy by Design:
“Privacy by Design” and “Security by Design” [are] both concepts
[that] seek to protect consumers’ privacy and security from the
outset of product design. In an era where AI systems and machine
learning, algorithms and big data sets can hire and fire, inform
health care decisions and extend financial opportunities, it is vital
that these technologies do not run counter to established legal
protections or public policy goals. In the same way companies
incorporate privacy and security, so too should we have Data Ethics
by Design. 230

The concern for AI system operators is that the data they use to
train the system not run afoul of privacy requirements and
expectations. As discussed, statutes require special treatment for
information pertaining to health, children, and consumer finance, and
normative privacy expectations also place some limits on the extent to
which an AI system will use datasets that violate consumer privacy.
In summary, using specific types of data, or using data in specific
contexts, can create issues that implicate privacy concerns that
trainers of AI systems ought to consider. Whether it is the type of
data, such as health data, or the subject of data, such as children, or
the context in which data is used, such as in consumer lending or

226. Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy’s Law of Design, UC IRVINE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (on file with authors).
227. Everson, supra note 223, at 29.
228. Id. at 33–34.
229. Id. at 34.
230. BIG DATA: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND SMART ENFORCEMENT, F.T.C., 2016 WL
5791537, at *5.
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other economic sectors protected by anti-discrimination legislation,
AI systems are operating in spaces governed by existing privacy and
anti-discrimination regulatory regimes. Hence, AI stakeholders,
including operators, must ensure that the datasets used to train their
AI systems do not violate these regulatory regimes. One way to start
meeting this obligation is through the Transparency Model proposed
in the following Part of the Article.
III. THE AI DATA TRANSPARENCY MODEL
A. The Need for an AI Data Transparency Model
The AI Data Transparency Model is a first step towards ensuring
that the data used to train AI systems complies with all relevant
regulations and societal expectations, which may otherwise limit the
AI’s use. In previous sections, this Article has identified some of the
many risks that AI systems could pose for individuals and society as a
whole. 231 This work also discussed the myriad ways in which the data
used in AI systems could run afoul of privacy and anti-discrimination
legal regimes. 232 The Transparency Model argues that dataset users
up and down the data supply chain must ensure that the data remains
in compliance with existing laws. In cases where AI systems are
provided or exposed to data, the trainers should actively ensure that
the providers include assurances of the data’s propriety. Audits
should evaluate the sources of the data, the data’s contents, and
whether the data’s use complies with any regulatory limits that arise.
These procedures should be reasonable and flexible, so that they can
conform to the type of data used and the role that the AI system
plays. Considering the crucial role that data plays in creating AI
systems and their outcomes, these procedures should be adopted and
standardized by stakeholders. There should also be a process
whereby conformity with the standards proposed herein can be
evaluated and certified by objective third parties. This will incentivize
best practices by encouraging transparent operations, which would
increase reputational risks for developers that do not pay appropriate
attention to the dangers enumerated above. While the suggested
Transparency Model will not solve all of the emerging issues
associated with AI systems, it will help clarify some of them while also
illuminating further areas of concern and giving guidelines to an
industry that currently operates in a regulatory vacuum.

231. See supra Part II.
232. See supra Section II.B.2.
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There are four main components to the proposed AI Data
Transparency Model. First, stakeholders in the AI systems industry
should conduct audits and examine the data their AI systems are
exposed to, according to the type of data collected and the risk of
misuse. Second, stakeholders should be required to retain the data
they used to train the AI in case there is a future need to further
scrutinize how the AI system was developed. Third, audits should be
standardized and conducted by objective third parties who are not the
developers themselves; these third parties should also certify the
results of the audits. Finally, the Transparency Model provides for a
safe harbor — AI systems operators should enjoy some protections
from liability in limited circumstances, when they earnestly comply
with the Model but harm occurs nonetheless.
The four components of the Transparency Model are just some of
many possible responses to the AI revolution. One alternative would
be to simply do nothing and allow this advanced technology to
develop further before trying to rein it in. But this alternative is a
dangerous one, as it does nothing to incentivize the cultivation of best
practices that consider the public interest early on. 233 Another
alternative is to reject the idea that individuals should have privacy
interests in their own data. After all, each individual’s respective, tiny
piece of data constitutes a minuscule percentage of the massive
datasets out there, composed of billions of individuals (as the adage
goes, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts). At the other
extreme, perhaps data should be controlled much more stringently, by
government regulators who would mandate inspections and require
disclosures, akin to the Securities and Exchange Commission or the
Internal Revenue Service. The proposed Transparency Model
represents an appropriate balance between these two extremes, and
will help incentivize more ethical uses of data by AI developers
without threatening or hindering the development of the technology
altogether.
The most prudent way to balance the need for AI innovation
against the dangers of discrimination, privacy violations and other
transgressions such as copyright infringement, is to mandate and
encourage disclosures of the types of data used and the manner in
which this data helps AI systems produce their output. The
disclosures should be the result of scrutinizing audits of the data,
which ought to evaluate the data’s integrity, origin, and quality, as
well as identify any potential for violating discrimination or privacy

233. Waldman, supra note 226.

2019]

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

475

statutes and norms. 234 These periodic audits should evaluate both the
training phase of the AI system, and how the system is continuously
operated. 235 They should examine where the datasets came from,
what information they contain, and what permissions and limitations
affect how the datasets can be used. 236
With all this information collected, the auditor should look at what
the AI system does and verify that its particular use, combined with
the type of data, does not run afoul of any regulatory requirements.237
It is imperative that the auditor be someone other than the
stakeholders themselves. Depending upon the sort of data collected
and the AI system’s purpose, this audit should examine the data
according to existing legal rules, such as those described above.
Problems resulting from bad data and harmful AI systems are not
necessarily attributable to a lack of legislation that proscribes
negative outcomes; rather, they are the result of the sophisticated
manner in which AI systems operate, which eludes easy
determinations of whether such practices comply with existing
legislation. Further, the difficulty of enforcing these laws on AI
systems is partially due to a lack of understanding of how AI systems
work, as well as an overreliance on, and false overconfidence in,
advanced technologies. 238
The purpose of the auditing process is to ensure reliability and trust
in the AI industry, while also enabling the technology to keep
growing and developing. The Transparency Model seeks to establish
a set of standards that would help address and reduce some of the
most common pitfalls and issues concerning misuse of datasets in AI
systems. The Model can be compared to the NIST Framework as
promulgated by the National Institute of Standards and Technology,
which created a multi-step process an entity can take to determine its
cybersecurity and data protection risks as well as to evaluate

234. Chander, supra note 102, at 1025 (“[T]he problem is not the black box . . . but
the real world on which it operates. We must design our algorithms for a world
permeated with the legacy of discriminations past and the reality of demonstrations
present.”).
235. Lehr & Ohm, supra note 45, at 655 (discussing the eight steps of an AI
system’s development).
236. See Mattioli, supra note 38, at 536–37 (discussing how data changes hands).
237. See supra Part II.
238. See generally BRUNDAGE ET AL., supra note 23, at 51 (discussing the rapidly
growing capabilities of AI and machine learning while highlighting the under-focused
collateral consequences from cyberthreats).
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appropriate responses. 239 The AI Data Transparency Model consists
of a set of checklists and tasks that provide a roadmap for AI
developers, trainers and operators to ensure that the data being used
complies with all relevant requirements.
In this sense, the
Transparency Model works to ensure that privacy and equality
protections are considered at each stage of AI development, rather
than only as an afterthought.
Another part of the Transparency Model will be to certify that AI
systems were successfully audited for unreasonable risks to privacy
and discrimination. This part of the Model is inspired by other
instances of disclosure and transparency rules that have worked in
other industries, such as food and drugs, and is consistent with other
scholars’ approaches to these issues. 240 There are many examples of
certification programs that indicate whether a product has
successfully met a particular set of standards: the organic food
labeling regime, which has helped foster a market for organic foods
and educates consumers about the ingredients in their foods; 241 or the
Kosher label added to foods after inspection by the relevant
authorities. 242
Finally, where an AI stakeholder substantially complies with the
Transparency Model, they should enjoy some degree of safe harbor
against liability for limited and inadvertent mistakes made by an AI
system. The Model does not include a strict liability regime for all
violations resulting from an errant AI system or slight mistakes in
datasets. This safe harbor serves numerous purposes. First, it
preserves judicial economy by preventing plaintiffs from insisting
retroactively on discovery into massive datasets. This is particularly
important when violations might be nothing more than inadvertent
infringements that represent small deviations from regulatory
requirements, in contrast to harms that result from an unwillingness
to protect against foreseeable consequences that derive from lack of
attention to the dataset’s composition and origin. Second, the Model

239. See Cybersecurity Framework, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH.,
https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework [https://perma.cc/4TU7-6BUZ].
240. For an argument that algorithms should be regulated in a similar manner to
environmental impact statements, see generally Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact
in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109 (2018).
241. See generally History of Organic Farming in the United States, SUSTAINABLE
AGRIC. RES. & EDUC., https://www.sare.org/Learning-Center/Bulletins/Transitioningto-Organic-Production/Text-Version/History-of-Organic-Farming-in-the-UnitedStates [https://perma.cc/JDY9-NSZ5].
242. See What Does Kosher Mean?, BADATZ IGUD R ABBONIM,
http://www.koshercertification.org.uk/whatdoe.html [https://perma.cc/748Q-HQLS].
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rewards desirable behavior by encouraging dataset owners to inquire
into the source of what they are using to train their AI systems, and
fosters sincere efforts to avoid violating the law. 243 Self-regulation
works when it can incentivize the internalization of risk, rather than
leaving consumers to accept the costs. The safe harbor would not
protect against intentional infringement or negligent standards
regarding the evaluation of datasets. As long as it is cheaper for an
AI operator to implement safeguards than it would be to risk legal
exposure, the operator would act rationally and seek to comply with
the requirements of the safe harbor. Finally, establishing this
juxtaposition will leave consumers better off, because the potential
harms of bad data and misused datasets will be alleviated such that
consumers will not be harmed in the first place.
B.

The Benefits of the AI Data Transparency Model

1.

The Benefit of Increased Transparency

The sort of transparency proposed in the AI Data Transparency
Model is not only beneficial by preventing the harms discussed in Part
I, regarding discrimination and privacy violations, but it is also
beneficial as an end itself. By cultivating a culture of transparency,
the fears and stigmas associated with AI systems can be mitigated,
and the Transparency Model will help instill a trust that machine
learning technologies will not be misused. 244 Transparency enables
“shaming” in the event that an AI system produces inappropriate
outcomes, though that presumes that there is an audience before
whom to shame the wrongdoer, and that the operator in charge of the
system would respond to such shaming. 245 Where an AI system
functions inappropriately — by, for example, misidentifying people of
color as criminals or rejecting great applicants for a job or educational
opportunity because of their gender — transparency helps society
understand what went wrong. Moreover, where the AI system
operator is dedicated to implementing steps to prevent such

243. For a proposal that copyright liability for webhosting providers should be
grounded in a safe harbor proposal, see generally Lital Helman & Gideon
Parchomovsky, The Best Available Technology Standard, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1194,
1217 (2011).
244. See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Elon Musk’s Billion-Dollar Crusade to Stop the
VANITY
FAIR
(Apr.
2017),
A.I.
Apocalypse,
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/03/elon-musk-billion-dollar-crusade-to-stop-aispace-x [https://perma.cc/FR2L-WCJ6].
245. Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1534–35 (2013).
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unfortunate outcomes, transparency helps that system operator show
that this mistake was unfortunate, rectifiable, and not the result of
wantonness or recklessness. 246 Further, transparency can help
identify which actor in the data supply chain is responsible — is the
violation the result of the data used to train the AI system, the biases
of the AI’s trainer, or an example of an AI system going out of tune
and running amok? Additionally, many of the prescriptions offered
here amount to “good press” as long as the AI operator is sufficiently
in compliance, as evidence of such compliance can help foster trust
between the operator and consumers. 247 By cultivating these positive
industry practices and standards, transparency increases trust in
machine learning technology itself and helps consumers understand
the ways in which they benefit from the technology.
It is true that what “transparency” calls for exactly is often
unclear, 248 but this is a strength of the Model proposed here, not a
flaw. “Transparency” could mean having a particular person
understand what aspects of their digital background led to a harmful
AI result. It might mean that individuals ought to know the
backgrounds of datapoints that are most similar to them, or the ways
in which they are similar to datapoints within the underlying dataset.
It could mean knowing the confidence level that the AI operator has
in the system, or the error rate of that system. It can mean an
understanding of the system itself, involving disclosure of information
regarding the system’s setup, the data used to train it, its objective
and predictive success, and other aspects of its operation. 249 Under
the Transparency Model, the meaning of “transparency” depends on
the nature of the AI program being evaluated. When “transparency”
serves as a means to achieve specific regulatory or business-oriented
objectives, such as anti-discrimination, privacy protection, or some
other concern that the dataset implicates, the Model can remain
relevant and impactful across industries and AI systems. By flexibly
adjusting to specific contexts, the Model helps avoid the problem of
untailored or overly-tailored approaches, which are either too
comprehensive for certain needs or too basic for others.

246. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 121.
247. See Desai & Kroll, supra note 28, at 58, 67.
248. See Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right
to an Explanation’ Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L.
& TECH. REV. 18, 58 (2017).
249. Id. at 55–56.
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Value Adding

At the core of the Transparency Model is the contention that
“bad” data, whether discriminatory or privacy-violating, reduces the
likelihood that AI systems will produce good outcomes. 250 By
facilitating a framework that reduces the use of problematic data, the
likelihood of adverse outcomes will similarly decrease. It is true that
requiring compliance with the Transparency Model will likely
increase the initial costs of training AI systems, which would
inevitably raise costs for consumers of goods or services provided by
or utilizing AI. However, the decreased risk of adverse outcomes
could offset some of those increased costs, and once consumers gain
trust in AI systems those costs would be offset even further.
Moreover, creditors and investors can gain confidence in the AI
system’s development, which might result in lower interest expenses
and transaction costs associated with raising capital. By certifying the
provenance and legitimacy of data, AI developers can aid their
investors in conducting due diligence.
Examples given throughout this Article provide support for this
argument. 251 Unjustified denials of promotions in the employment
context leads to talented individuals going unrewarded. This creates
costs for the company in that it now has a worse employment
hierarchy than it would have had, and in that it could lose that
employee entirely because she feels slighted by the lack of promotion.
Similarly, unwarranted denials of credit by AI systems that wrongly
predict creditworthiness lead to less customers for credit card and
finance companies, which leads to less revenue for that company and
diminished economic activity for society at large. In the same vein,
schools that use AI systems to evaluate student applications could see
a weaker student body if that system fails to identify worthy
applicants simply because they do not fit the “traditional” standard
that system was taught. In each of these examples, the goal is clear: to
find the best applicant. A more fine-tuned AI system can reach
better results than a system whose operations and development are
not scrutinized. Hence, while implementing the Transparency Model
may increase costs due to auditing the data for all stakeholders in an

250. See generally Thomas C. Redman, Bad Data Costs the U.S. $3 Trillion Per
Year, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 22, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/09/bad-data-costs-the-u-

s-3-trillion-per-year [https://perma.cc/Z4RB-SRQH] (noting that bad data costs U.S.
corporations over $3 trillion a year, according to IBM).
251. See supra Part II.
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AI system, from development to operations, the final output of those
systems may very well be far more valuable.
In Part II above, this Article addressed possible evils that can result
from faultily-composed datasets, which can lead AI systems to
discriminate against protected groups or to violate privacy
protections. Just because these injuries occur “beneath the surface,”
embedded within the training of an AI system, does not mean that
they are excusable. As AI systems participate more and more in
business operations, their developers will have to grapple with the
serious issues that surround the ways AI systems use data. There are
already examples of businesses that suffer reputational harms when
datasets cause AI systems to perform inappropriately or illegally, and
there is no sound reason to de-emphasize scrutiny in this space merely
because the mechanisms are more complicated than traditional
business practices.

3.

Flexibility

As briefly touched upon above, the Transparency Model is flexible
in nature. The scrutiny of the auditing process should change
depending upon what is reasonable under the circumstances — in
light of how the data was collected and what the responsibility of the
trained AI will be. In other words, scrutiny may be higher or lower
depending on the particular outcome that the AI system produces:
If the private sector industry in question is regulated, such as the
auto or pharmaceutical industry, evidence of correctness can
naturally become a requirement. If the sector in question is not
regulated . . . [the entity] should consider their requirements for
demonstrating the correctness of their automated decision making
as a best practice, since it will enable trust in their products and
services. 252

For example, an AI that drives cars, analyzes medical symptoms or
manages pension fund portfolios should have its data more closely
scrutinized than an AI created to play a board game. 253 These
considerations inform the evaluator of what the probability of an
undesirable outcome may be, and what the consequences for such an

252. See Desai & Kroll, supra note 28, at 45–46.
253. Compare Bernard Marr, The Amazing Ways Tesla Is Using Artificial
FORBES
(Jan.
8,
2018),
Intelligence
and
Big
Data,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/01/08/the-amazing-ways-tesla-isusing-artificial-intelligence-and-big-data/#fb9fc8d42704
[https://perma.cc/UV5V6A47], with Google AI Defeats Human Go Champion, BBC (May 25, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40042581 [https://perma.cc/6Z9E-8ATT].
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outcome would look like. Regulated sectors, such as housing,
employment, and healthcare must obviously comply with all relevant
legal requirements, which would inform the evaluator about the
harms she is scrutinizing the AI system for. On the other hand, where
the AI exists for entertainment, the evaluator may consider the harms
that privacy encroachments pose for the company’s reputation, the
need to collect such data, or the risk of harms that a breach of the
data would cause the subjects in the dataset. In short, the evaluator
would need to consider both legal requirements, where applicable, as
well as normative and reputational ones, and have the flexibility to
weigh AI data violations differently according to the circumstances.
Because AI is rapidly developing, maintaining a flexible approach
to regulation can efficiently and fairly balance the utility of
developing the technology against the costs that society could
suffer. 254 Within the copyright regime, for example, a “technological
fair use” doctrine would properly balance the equities between the
need to grow the technology sector and the rights of the copyright
holders to avoid AI systems from using and relying on their works. 255
This notion of fair use could also apply to the harms addressed here,
to instances where the AI operators make clear and concerted efforts
to avoid violative results that infringe on privacy or produce
undesirable outcomes. In short, it is not the case that the nature of
AI as a black box will inevitably lead to rampant discrimination, but
its use will not lead to the end of discrimination either. It is the case,
however, that encouraging AI operators to be transparent about how
they use data and what that data is, and certifying that they are not
behaving in ways that increase discriminatory outcomes, could steer
AI systems towards less discriminatory outcomes, benefiting society
at large.
The proposed Transparency Model focuses on what is
ascertainable by inspecting and evaluating the data, rather than the
mysterious inner-workings of an algorithm that returns results with
unintelligible rationales. 256 It also helps fill a void, also noticed by
other scholars, by focusing on data rather than on the algorithm that

254. Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 802 (2010)
(arguing for a reconfiguration of the fair use defense, in copyright infringement cases,
to encapsulate new uses of copyrighted works by technology).
255. Id. at 838.
256. See W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419,
432–34 (2015).

482

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

is using this data. 257 A rigid regulatory scheme risks both overregulation and under-regulation. The former of these would subject
certain AI systems to requirements that are unnecessary to achieve
the regulation’s objective of careful scrutiny of potentially harmful
data. The latter would fail to protect against a developer or AI
system that fails to proscribe undesirable data uses. Thus, the
Transparency Model is intentionally limited in the sense that it does
not have specific requirements that should apply to every AI system,
apart from continued compliance with existing laws. AI systems exist
in far-flung industries, utilizing vastly different datasets for any
number of distinct uses — the solution devised to promote accuracy
in results from AI systems must be equally flexible.
C.

1.

Theoretical Justifications

Law and Economic Theory: Transparency, Accountability, and
Efficiency

At the core of the Transparency Model is the contention that
transparency is a precursor to accountability: “If law and due process
are absent from this field, we are essentially paving the way to a new
feudal order of unaccountable reputational intermediates.” 258 This
means that society cannot hold a malicious algorithm accountable if it
does not subject it to some measure of transparency. The converse of
this is also true, that society must keep transparent the process of
holding algorithms accountable. As one set of authors noted:
Strong arguments support the position that algorithmic agents that
operate without proper, or flawed, human oversight; or absent of
well-defined governance and ethical frameworks, may have negative
effects on greater societal norms and values such as the holy
triumvirate of liberte, egalite, fraternité — or to put it in the
language of the existing legal frameworks, fundamental human
rights and freedoms, equality and social cohesion. 259

Because these values are so integral to society, the implication is
that transparency serves dual purposes — as a corollary norm to

257. Lehr & Ohm, supra note 45, at 655 (“[A]lmost all of the significant legal
scholarship to date has focused on the implications of the running model . . . and has
neglected most of the possibilities and pitfalls of playing with the data.”).
258. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 3, at 19.
259. B. Bodo et al., Tackling the Algorithmic Control Crisis — The Technical,
Legal, and Ethical Challenges of Research into Algorithmic Agents, 19 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 133, 137 (2017).

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

2019]

483

fundamental human rights, and as a means to ensure that those
fundamental rights are not infringed upon.
The theory of law and economics suggests that where the
operations and development of AI systems are made more
transparent, transactions between their operators and consumers will
become more efficient. 260 Without transparency, there is no way for
consumers to determine how much data collectors take, what sort of
data they take, with whom they share it, and how they use it.261
Transparency is a means by which society can verify that the
drawbacks of AI systems do not outweigh the benefits. Because
rights and responsibilities can conflict with one another, in order to
ascertain whether an AI system imposes itself on other arenas that
merit protection, some aspects of the system should be reviewable
and accessible. Mandating transparency can also facilitate innovation
by opening access to the data inputs used by one successful enterprise
to the benefit of all. Hence, when an entity uses data in predictive
analytics, but did not collect that data itself, a degree of transparency
is necessary to ensure that contractual or statutory limitations on the
use of that data are not breached. 262 Transparency can help alleviate
the numerous risks created when this kind of data is used, including
the possibility of security breaches, inadvertent nonconsensual uses,
or worse — that a machine learning algorithm could use data in ways
that violate privacy and anti-discrimination laws.

2.

The Market Structure and the Multi-Player Model

A common characteristic of a completed AI system is that
numerous entities contributed to its development. At least ten
different types of actors can help program an AI system, including the
software trainers, the data provider, the feedback provider (or
trainer), the user, the owner and her employees, her investors, the
public or the government, and even the AI itself. 263 Any of these
players can expose an AI system to data, which can then be
distributed to other players who may combine it with more data,
resulting in new sources and insights. 264 This distribution of labor
creates problems of knowledge and oversight over the contents of the
260. See Posner, supra note 130, at 394–403.
261. See Everson, supra note 223, at 33–34.
262. Max N. Helveston, Consumer Protection in the Age of Big Data, 93 WASH. U.
L. REV. 859, 873–74 (2016).
263. See Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 29, at 692.
264. For a discussion of the Multiplayer Model, see generally Yanisky-Ravid &
Liu, supra note 12, at 2216.
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dataset. Because the sources of access to new data are so diffuse, it
becomes more difficult to determine who should be responsible for
bad data. Someone who downloads a dataset of millions of images to
train a facial recognition AI may not realize that the dataset was
biased in ways that could produce discriminatory outcomes. She may
not realize, for example, that the datapoints therein are largely
composed of Caucasian faces, limiting the utility of the dataset in
recognizing other racial groups. This hypothetical demonstrates that
the Multi-Player nature of AI development increases the risk that
datasets could be compromised by impermissible datapoints.
Data is not only collected by entities that use it for their own
purposes, but it is also distributed to other entities who may use it for
the same, or for a different purpose than the original data collector. 265
Indeed, some data collectors retain data solely to distribute it to other
users. Whenever datasets change hands, are adjusted for analysis, or
combined with other data, the possibility of misuse or corruption
grows. 266 This also complicates any effort to ensure consensual use of
data, because at a certain point it could very well become impossible
to ascertain where the specific datapoint originated from, and
whether that datapoint was permissibly collected. A given consumer,
concerned about the diffusion of their information, cannot readily
control their information absent some degree of transparency.
Additionally, even if the consumer initially consented to various
piecemeal collections of their personal data, if those datapoints are
aggregated the result could create a profile of that consumer far
beyond anything she ever thought was possible. Thus, the main
purpose of the AI Data Transparency Model is to focus on the long
run, by incentivizing stakeholders to use reliable data, thereby
focusing on the prevention of harm rather than the assignment of
liability.

3.

Law and Economic Theory: Self-Regulating Incentive
Mechanism

One glaring problem of AI applications is how difficult it is for
someone to know if they were incorrectly “rejected” or labeled
“unworthy.” For a host of reasons, self-regulation offers a more
efficient route to ascertaining the chances that these unfortunate
results will occur. First, the applicant or consumer may not be aware
that the company is utilizing an AI system, so it would be impossible

265. See Helveston, supra note 262, at 874.
266. See id.
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for her to suspect that her rejection occurred because of a
misconfigured AI system. Next, considering the explosion of uses of
AI systems in a wide variety of commercial arenas, it is unlikely that a
government response could adequately regulate a technological tool
that is used for all sorts of purposes in a multitude of economic
sectors, transcending the regulatory jurisdictions currently carved out
in the United States. Instead, each company that utilizes an AI
system is in a far better position to make sure that it is operating
within the confines of the law. Just as regulatory authorities depend
on independent audits by accountants to ensure the financial
propriety of large corporations, so too could the government depend
on private sector audits that ensure compliance with federal law in AI
systems. This is not to say that the government should play no role in
regulating AI, but rather to argue that any effective regulatory regime
will require private sector involvement and cooperation, and that all
of this begins with transparency.
CONCLUSION
The advent of huge data sources facilitates numerous applications:
“trends/pattern analysis; regulatory compliance; fraud detection and
prevention; predictive analysis and modeling; incident prediction;
geo-correlation; sentiment analysis; diagnostic and medical use; and
others.” 267 In some cases, the data used in machine learning tends to
have numerous features in common. First, it is non-exclusive and
non-rivalrous, and multiple parties can use the same data without
consequence. For the most part, it is inexpensive and easily collected.
Moreover, it is everywhere. 268 This Article demonstrates that AI
systems are delving more and more into areas that are protected,
regulated, and valued in special ways, implicating privacy and equality
concerns. As AI systems delve into these highly sensitive areas of
society, operators must carefully consider the risks that arise when
they mistreat and misuse data. The AI Data Transparency Model
suggested here can help address these risks. As part of the
Transparency Model, AI stakeholders should implement privacy and
equality by design, adopting guidelines that meet legal requirements
from the very first moment they expose their system to data.
Stakeholders should audit the datasets they use to train their AI,
relying on independent third parties who can verify that their data

267. Id. at 870.
268. See D. Daniel Sokol & Roisin Comerford, Antitrust and Regulating Big Data,
23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1129, 1136–37 (2016).
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practices do not run afoul of existing norms and legislation.
Additionally, a third-party certification mechanism can increase
public trust regarding the use of AI systems, and help companies save
face when mistakes do occur. Finally, to incentivize compliance with
these recommendations, a safe harbor is appropriate for operators
who make special efforts to avoid the dataset problems discussed.
These recommendations will not be possible without significant
increases in transparency, which is a means to facilitate continued
innovation in this field without increasing the risk of public backlash.
AI technologies have great potential to tremendously benefit society,
but without transparent, careful progress, they can violate
fundamental principles of equality, fairness, and privacy.

